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Abstract
The municipal bond market is widely perceived to be 
amenable to influence peddling between parties to bond 
transactions. One of the primary concerns of both 
regulators and investors is the relationship between 
political contributions by bond market participants and 
the volume and profitability of bond market business 
engaged in by those participants. This study uses 
publicly available data from the state of Louisiana to 
provide evidence concerning the relationship between 
contributions made by bond market participants and bond 
business awarded or influenced by recipients of those 
contributions.
Contributions by bond market players to officials 
likely to possess influence over bond transactions are 
determined to be larger than those made by other 
contributors, and candidates for three of the offices 
examined are identified as receiving significant 
contributions from bond market players. A relationship 
is similarly found between contribution levels and method 
of bond issue placement.
The study also investigates financial information 
disclosure by bond issuing entities and the effects of 
that disclosure upon bond prices. Timely disclosure, as
vi
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measured by compliance with state reporting regulation, 
is found to have no discernable effect upon bond interest 
costs. The information content of financial reports is 
modelled by Brown's Index, and is shown to be a 
significant component of the interest cost model.
vii
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Chapter One
Introduction
The municipal bond market is currently the subject 
of SEC scrutiny, multiple courtroom debates, several 
congressional investigations and numerous articles in the 
financial and general press. This research project 
speaks to one aspect of that market: the reputed 
relation between political contributions and municipal 
bond transactions. Specifically, the research question 
addressed is:
Is there a direct and positive relationship between 
political contributions made by players in the bond 
market1 and (1) selection of these players for 
various bond deals and (2) bond prices [Net Interest 
Cost]? Further, is there a relationship between 
availability of financial information and bond 
prices?
l'Players in the bond market1 is a term of art intended to 
refer to those firms and individuals whose occupation is 
providing services to issuers of municipal securities. 
This includes underwriters, bond counsel, those issuing 
legal opinions, and other consultants or advisers to the 
process.
1
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
The importance of this question is demonstrated by 
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board's [henceforth 
MSRB] recently issued Rule G-37 [MSRB 1994]. Rule G-37 
prohibits any player in the bond market from doing 
business with state or local governments or their funding 
entities for two years after that firm's dealers, bond 
professionals or political action committee(s) contribute 
to an officeholder in those governments. This rule was 
prompted by the widespread perception that influence over 
municipal bond transactions is routinely used by elected 
officials to extract contributions from market players, 
and has exposed the MSRB to a hail of criticism 
concerning its de facto interference in the political 
process.
Regulation intended to influence the behaviour of 
political actors cannot help but reflect legislator and 
regulator perceptions of the political process.
Providing those legislators and regulators with empirical 
data verifying the existence or lack thereof of this 
widely assumed influence peddling in the bond market will 
enable them to develop more accurate perceptions of the 
political process, which should result in more 
appropriate regulation of that process. Importantly, 
regulation to date has focused on those methods of
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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influence purchase amenable to discovery - that is, cash 
contributions to political campaigns. As discussed 
later, there are myriad other avenues available to those 
wishing to provide "off the record" support for 
candidates [thus possibly purchasing influence].
This study makes no attempt to investigate those 
avenues of support, as the data would necessarily be 
anecdotal and thus not amenable to statistical analysis. 
Corollary to this limitation of data is a restriction on 
interpretation of results: a finding of no relation 
between contributions by players and municipal bond 
business volume or actual bond interest rates may not be 
seen as conclusive evidence that influence peddling does 
not take place. A failure to find a significant relation 
between contributions and bond business should rather be 
interpreted as an indication that if said influence 
peddling is taking place, it is transacted through 
channels other than explicit campaign contributions.
This would mean, of course, that current MSRB disclosure 
regulations focusing on reported contributions will 
probably not have much effect on the widely theorized 
influence peddling.
Both the MSRB and the SEC have vigourously defended 
Rule G-37, and both maintain their intention to continue
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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targeting undue influence in the municipal marketplace. 
This despite stories in the press of "workarounds" 
sculpted by players in the municipal bond market that 
conform to the letter of G-37 while allowing players to 
continue supplying funds to candidates. These 
"workarounds" may be as simple as providing resources for 
campaign fundraising events or as complex as providing 
for third party contributions (e.g., employing an 
independent political consultant who contributes 
heavily). To date the MSRB has mandated disclosure of 
contributions by market players and their consultants, 
and has imposed restrictions on market players' freedom 
to participate in transactions with state or local 
governments whose elected officials accepted campaign 
contributions from them or their consultants. Market 
players, meanwhile, protest that the government has yet 
to provide any authentication of their claims about 
influence-peddling. This study seeks to provide some 
evidence of the existence, or lack thereof, of that 
influence-peddling, again subject to the caveat that only 
reported contributions are analyzed.
Ramifications of this issue for accountants are 
varied. First, CPAs often function as advisors to bond 
transactions or evaluators of the adequacy of refunding
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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arrangements. Thus CPAs are as susceptible as other
market players to rent extraction by officials peddling
influence over the bond transaction, and are likely to be
affected by regulations concerning contribution activity.
Second, this issue is part of a wider drive for more
complete and continued disclosure by municipal bond
issuers. Obviously, those responsible for issuance of
financial reports by debt-issuing entities will find
themselves affected by this increased workload. CPAs
functioning as auditors for issuers will also be affected
by the need for continued disclosure.
Third and finally, the SEC specifically mentions the
need for improved:
[D]isclosure of potential conflicts of interest and 
material financial and business relationships among 
issuers, advisers and underwriters, including those 
arising.from political contributions... [SEC 1994, 
emphasis mine].
It seems likely that the SEC will attempt to impose at
least some responsibility for disclosure upon auditors of
governmental entity financial statements, as it has upon
auditors of nongovernmental organizations. Thus, the
results of this research project can provide guidance for
the accounting profession as well as input into the
policy setting process. Importantly, regulation may be
driven more by a need to influence public perceptions
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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than a desire to effectively restrict behaviour. This 
study speaks to the likelihood of regulation altering the 
behaviour patterns of elected officials and bond market 
players rather than the effects of said regulation on 
attitudes about the bond market.
Perhaps because of the difficulty in obtaining 
details of political contributions, and in discovering 
the linkages between individual contributors and player 
firms, there is not a well-established methodology for 
research of this nature. Further, the availability of 
data concerning bond issues placed prior to recent rules 
on reporting such information [e.g., the 1993 disclosure 
mandate issued by the Louisiana legislature] is limited 
as well. In an attempt to overcome the limitations of 
data availability, this study will be limited to the 
state of Louisiana, and the 1991 - 1994 election cycle. 
Limiting the study to data from one state severely limits 
the extensibility of the study to other states, however 
that extensibility is somewhat suspect in any event 
because campaign finance statutes and bond issuance 
regulations vary widely by state.
The 1991 election cycle was selected for several 
reasons. First, MSRB regulation G-37 took effect in 
1995, thus making the 1991 cycle the last "free for all"
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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cycle. Postulating that market players were aware of 
increasing federal agency concern with influence 
peddling, and that players were motivated to take full 
advantage of a soon to be unlawful strategy, there is a 
distinct possibility that contributory activities 
increased in this period. One of the measures of proper 
targeting of contribution regulation [subject, as 
discussed earlier, to the assumption that the purpose of 
regulation is to inhibit undesirable behaviour rather 
than to influence public perceptions] is the extent to 
which that soon-to-be regulated behaviour occurs prior to 
the effective date of the regulation.
Secondly, campaign reporting regulations underwent 
several modifications after the 1991 cycle, including the 
removal of a requirement that campaign finance filings be 
cumulative in nature. This change in filing format 
increases the difficulty of data collection, and 
simultaneously increases the probability that 
contributions which should be included in the data set 
will be excluded.
Finally, reporting requirements had been in place 
for previous elections, thus candidates and their 
respective campaign organizations should have been 
familiar with those requirements. Staff at the Ethics
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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Commission for Elected Officials had also had the 
opportunity, in the course of auditing past filings, to 
assist candidates in understanding what information 
needed to be filed and what format that information 
should take.
Contribution data has been collected for all 
relevant statewide offices by inspection of campaign 
finance filings with the State Board of Ethics for 
Elected Officials [henceforth SBE]. Firm affiliations of 
individual contributors are established by comparison of 
contributor data with membership lists of the relevant 
professional organizations and by review of 'The Red 
Book', which is a publication listing players in the 
municipal market by firm and location. Contributor data 
for bond counsel was also verified by review of the 
Martindale-Hubbell directory of attorneys by 
specialization. In the spirit of conservative data 
modeling, this process, if not completely accurate, will 
understate the relation between player political activity 
and business volume or bond rates.
Data was collected for bond issues by entities 
within Louisiana for the period 1991 through 1995, as 
tabulated by the Louisiana Bond Commission [LBC]. 
Louisiana statutes require that all governmental entities
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
seeking to issue debt present their offering for the 
approval of the LBC. Utilizing a fairly complete 
population of bond issues will provide greater 
generalizability of results as well as greater likelihood 
of finding an effect.
An initial analysis is performed using various 
statistical tests that a), provide some indication of the 
relation between the population of contributor/players 
and the population of contributors in general, b), 
compare the distribution of the volume of player bond- 
related business with the distribution of player 
contributions, and c), examine the relation between 
player contributions and the decision to competitively 
bid the issue. These tests should provide evidence of 
the existence and strength of the relation between 
contributions and player business.
Candidates for office frequently encounter 
significant startup expenses when initiating campaigns. 
Timing of contributions is therefore an important aspect 
of campaign finance. This study focusses on the relation 
between contribution amounts and bond business rather 
than contribution timing. Contribution amounts are 
summed over the entire election period rather than 
specifically identified by date. Analysis of "early
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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money” contributions is thus not possible within the 
scope of this project.
Following this general analysis, further examination 
of the data is performed using regression techniques to 
investigate the effects of contributions on net debt 
cost. That is, the tests will provide evidence 
concerning the public costs of public officials peddling 
influence for contributions. For this purpose, public 
cost is defined as an increase in NIC attributable to 
campaign contributions by bond issue participants. This 
analysis should yield information useful in deciding how 
much to spend in alleviating the hypothesized problem.
Importantly, this portion of the project utilizes a 
base regression model well established in the literature, 
which helps to ensure that any finding of public cost 
[that is, NIC greater than the base regression model 
would predict] is not an artefact of an unrelated 
characteristic of the issue. This project should 
therefore be seen as an incremental approach to the 
general problem of the municipal bond market rather than 
as a novel approach to a specific aspect of that market.
Hildreth [1993] suggests that the solicitation 
and/or making of political contributions by players in 
the municipal bond market can generate two fundamental
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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types of problems: (1) contributions are made in an 
attempt to obtain or retain business, and (2) 
contributions are made to "allow" entry into the pool of 
underwriters (i.e., "pay to play"). Note that these 
problems relate to a relationship between underwriters 
and politicians having influence over placement of bond 
issues. Both of these possibilities are exacerbated by 
the frequent use of negotiated rather than competitively 
bid sales transactions. Competitively bid sales can 
reduce the risk of either type of problem to some degree, 
however it should be noted that even under a perfectly 
competitive regime the possibility of soliciting 
contributions in exchange for non-underwriting consulting 
work or eventual resale of bonds at favorable rates 
continues to exist.
It is also important to consider the contributory
behaviour of market players from a broad perspective.
That is, contributors are probably not making donations
in hopes of influencing a single transaction, or for that
matter a single type of transaction. As Rasmusen &
Ramseyer [1994] note in a discussion of bribes that
relates equally well to campaign contributions:
Through the contributions, the lobbyist obtains not a 
vote but the privilege of conveying information to the 
legislator, [p. 315]
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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For instance, a bond attorney may very well make 
contributions to campaigns with the simultaneous goals of 
a) gaining business by "locking in" his position as bond 
counsel, b) gaining business by being seen to be a 
confidant of the candidate's, and c) gaining business in 
non-bond related areas by increasing awareness of his 
firm.
Similarly, an investment banker may be interested in 
garnering a local government's short-term investment 
business as well as underwriting its bond issues.
This perspective allows us to dismiss worries about 
targeting specific contributions to specific ends: we can 
safely assume that influence, once purchased, will be 
used wherever profitable (and possible).
Given the relative uniqueness of the topic under 
investigation, a discussion of theoretic underpinnings 
to these assumptions about influence peddling is 
appropriate. Section I provides a description of the 
transactions under investigation which section II builds 
upon by using extant theories (principal-agent and 
competitive markets) to motivate the situation and 
players. Section III summarizes the data required to 
investigate these motivations. While this study is 
largely descriptive and does not attempt to develop
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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hypotheses differentiating eventualities under the 
various theories, it is important to attempt at least a 
general theoretic explanation for why the behaviour this 
study investigates might occur.
A. The Bond Issue Transaction
The sequence of transactions involved in municipal 
bond issuance is convoluted and dependent upon several 
endogenous factors. That being the case, it is 
worthwhile to enumerate a generic sequence of events to 
facilitate later discussion of the motivations and 
actions of the various players.
The first step in the process is, obviously, a 
governmental unit deciding to issue debt securities.
This is an iterative process of comparing costs and 
timing of revenue and payment streams over several 
alternatives. This task is usually completed with the 
assistance of several players, (1) the unit's bond 
counsel, (2) a financial advisor, (3) representative (s) 
of the likely underwriter(s) , and (4) the unit's legal 
counsel. Decisions are made as to the net proceeds 
reasonably realizable, the amount of debt to be issued 
(face value, which is not equal to the amount of proceeds 
in most cases), stated interest rate (which is usually 
not the same as the rate at which the issue is sold to
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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underwriters or that earned by eventual holders), timing 
of interest payments, and callability features.
For purposes of this study, governmental unit may be 
defined as an agency of the state government of Louisiana 
or one of its political subdivisions [parishes, 
municipalities or special funding districts]. This 
includes agencies such as the Louisiana Public Facilities 
Authority (LPFA), Louisiana Public Housing Authority 
(LPHA), etc. The preponderance of these agencies are 
staffed by administrators who are appointed rather than 
elected. While appointment of administrators might seem 
to negate the utility of an investigation of campaign 
contributions, it merely places influence peddling on a 
less direct level. Officials of these agencies are 
appointed by elected officials (largely the Governor), 
and thus are susceptible to the direction of those 
elected individuals. It is reasonable to expect that 
these appointed administrators will seek to please the 
person(s) responsible for their position. Thus any undue 
influence will be passed through from elected official to 
decision maker. Given the by nature larger dollar volume 
of state-wide agencies compared with parish or municipal 
entities, attempts at influence peddling should be more 
discernible at the state-wide office level.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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The second step in the process is selection of an 
underwriter (or more often in recent years, a team of 
underwriters) . The governmental unit often makes 
negotiated sales of its bonds to underwriters - that is, 
it does not go through the competitive bidding process2. 
Some states, Louisiana for instance, have an agency 
specifically charged with reviewing issues for all 
entities within the state prior to placement: these
agencies typically recommend competitive placement.
Note, however, that recommendations are precisely that - 
recommendations and not mandates. As staff at these 
agencies freely admit, there are numerous legal loopholes 
allowing entities to circumvent agency recommendations, 
and several rationales for preferring negotiated 
placement.3
As a more complete picture of the bond issuance 
process emerges, including the ways in which players take 
advantage of their private information and positions of
Nationally, approximately 80 percent of new bond issues 
are placed by negotiation rather than competitive bid.
3A staff person at the Louisiana Bond Commission related 
the story of the Avondale bond issue. It seems that even 
though the structures to be constructed are several hundred 
yards in length, weigh thousands of tons, and are designed 
to be stationary and permanently anchored, bringing to mind 
buildings rather than vessels, the bond issue was exempt 
from LBC governance because these structures are not land 
structures. As the staff person put it, "All they need is 
clever counsel."
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16
relative power, states are increasingly writing 
legislation requiring competitively bid sales. The 
primary point of competitively bid sales is reducing the 
ability of underwriters to buy bond business via 
political contributions, a secondary effect being to 
ensure the highest price possible for the bonds. 
Unfortunately, this tactic is having only limited effect 
as politicians, and the administrators they appoint, can 
effectively constrain membership in the pool of 
underwriters allowed to place bids by setting up 
certification processes of various sorts.
Finally, the underwriters offer the bonds to 
investors, making a profit on the spread between their 
cost and the market rate at time of sale. It is apparent 
that timing of the issue can be a crucial issue for 
underwriters, who carry the risk of unfavourable market 
rate fluctuations. Another important factor is the 
credit rating assigned to the issue or to the entity 
itself. Issuing entities are interested in being rated 
as highly as possible, since a higher rating translates 
into a larger potential market for the issue. Issuing 
entities may also be interested in facilitating the 
timing of the issue's sale, so as to demonstrate to
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
17
prospective bidders on future debt issues that the 
entity is a cooperative member of the relationship4.
These transactions are assumed by oversight agencies 
to be market-driven and market-policed, an assumption 
that, according to the media, these agencies should be 
disabused of. Given the peripatetic nature of bond 
issuance, it is prudent to recognize that the trusting 
reliance on market structure evinced by oversight 
agencies is indeed misplaced. Moreover, the after-market 
for municipal bonds is far from complete; trading is 
infrequent and no system presently exists to publicize 
bid-ask quotes when trades do occur.
The bond issuance process, as a result of the 
situations articulated above, is susceptible to abuses of 
the public trust and unfairly advantaged trading by some 
players. As a necessary precursor to any conclusions 
about causes or solutions to such abuses, the next 
section attempts to explain the actions of various 
players from the perspectives of two theories of economic 
behaviour.
4This aspect of the issuer - underwriter relationship is 
pointed out in Lynch [1996].
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B . Theoretic Background
Tax-exempt bonds have historically been investment 
vehicles bought and sold in relative obscurity. The 
business press discussed these bonds mostly in relation 
to changes in the tax code, and the lack of transaction 
volume made the provision of pricing information 
problematic. Federal regulatory agencies have treated 
bonds as a locally regulated issue, opting to stay out of 
the process, leaving disclosure an open question usually 
answered by underwriters. In this information scarce 
environment opportunism can and arguably does flourish.
Recently, significant attention has been devoted to 
municipal bonds, probably as a result of the default of 
several very large issues.5 Concomitantly, the clamor 
for modification of the bond market has become louder. 
This section of the chapter seeks to articulate some of 
the underlying motivations for observed behaviour on the 
part of bond market players, a necessary prerequisite to 
legislating constraints that will alter that behaviour.
This issue can be approached most directly from a 
competitive markets perspective. Keim & Zardkoohi [1988] 
provide a cogent analysis of the solicitation of and
5see Schifrin [1989], Hawthorne [1987], Business Week 
[1993] for a sample of reporting about municipal bonds.
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influence by PAC contributions that applies equally well 
to influence with respect to the bond transactions 
studied here. Keim & Zardkoohi's perspective of the 
market for campaign contributions is empirically 
supported by Snyder [1990]. Snyder uses data from open- 
seat races for the U.S. House of Representatives during 
the period 1980 - 1986 to validate a simple model based 
on the idea of campaign contributions as investments. 
Results of the analysis support Keim & Zardkoohi's work. 
Following their lead, we view the bond issuance 
transaction as taking place in a market for services 
(influence).
Adapting their perspective, underwriters are seen to 
be buyers of future business, while candidates for office 
are sellers of "good will" that ostensibly assures the 
buyers of future business. Note that the buyers are not 
certain of actually receiving the influence they pay for, 
as the election is, at least in some sense, a gamble. 
Therefore buyers are motivated toward two activities that 
moderate the "cost" of acquiring influence. Even given 
that potential profits from bond business are quite 
large, buyers are still motivated to minimize the expense 
of capturing that business. Buyers may well consider 
campaign contributions as relatively minor expenses, but
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expense minimization remains a primary tool for 
increasing profits.
For illustrative purposes, assume that the influence 
underwriters are trying to buy is only useable during the 
immediately subsequent term of office. This assumption 
merely clarifies the situation, relaxing it does not 
change the point or the motivations behind actions. In 
fact, relaxing this assumption, that is looking for 
influence-peddling over a longer period of time, would 
make finding evidence of the hypothesized relation more 
likely.
First, underwriters seek to drive the price of said 
influence down in response to the risk that their 
candidate will not be successful. This price reducing 
behaviour is moderated by the knowledge that at some 
point reduced contributions could be a causal factor in 
the candidate's failure to win the election. Candidates 
are motivated by their need for reputation to fulfill 
their obligation to exert influence on their 
contributors' behalf.
The second response of buyers to the cost of 
influence, in this case targeted toward reduction of risk 
rather than reduction of outlay, is to purchase influence 
from all candidates. This practice should be reflected
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in campaign contributions to every candidate. Again, it 
is obvious that this strategy has negative ramifications, 
assuming that there is some increase in probability of 
election associated with an increase in funds available. 
The negative ramifications are the tendency of 
contributory behaviour to spiral the cost of successful 
campaigns (hence the cost of influence) upward. In this 
case the buyers, in an attempt to reduce risk, increase 
costs for themselves.
Bondholders are affected by similar motivations. 
Rather than purchasing business, they are seeking to 
purchase an investment that pays better than alternatives 
available in the market. Importantly, that increased 
payoff may consist entirely of risk reduced below the 
level assessed by the general marketplace. In the 
obvious case, the bondholder is provided information not 
publicly available regarding the 'true' financial 
situation of the entity, or is provided assurances of 
payment not incorporated into the formal bond purchase 
agreement. For this strategy to work, underwriters do not 
need to be party to private information concerning actual 
risk levels or the arrangement between officeholder and 
bondholder. Because of the lack of information 
concerning the identities of ultimate bondholders, this
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facet of the hypothesized relation will not be 
investigated.
A similarly useful perspective to adopt is that of 
principal-agent theory. Under this theory, all players 
are modeled as self-interested and able to make rational 
decisions based upon complete information in furtherance 
of that self-interest.6 While the issue of information 
availability to decision makers is key to hypotheses 
developed under this theory, the present analysis does 
not address the issues of continued information 
disclosure by issuing entities. The study focuses rather 
on the behaviour of parties to the debt issuance 
transaction.
The very nature of representative forms of 
government mandates that a subset of government 
transactions will occur outside the boundaries of 
publicly observable behaviour. The important issue here 
becomes moral hazard (the ability of agents to make 
choices that are not discernable to the principal, that 
is, choices not affecting reputation). In this case the
6Simon [1982] and others have addressed the more 
realistic situation where information is incomplete 
and/or decision makers have limited abilities to process 
information. As our focus is on putatively unobservable 
behaviour rather than decision making mechanisms, this 
study does not address those issues.
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decisions themselves, as well as the outcomes of those 
decisions, may not be apparent to the general public. 
Agency theory, with its focus on moral hazard, thus has 
several applications to the topic of this study.
On the highest level, the candidate seeks to achieve 
a position with access to public resources. Her self- 
interested goal is to maximize her benefit from these 
resources. This self-interested goal remains relevant 
even if contributions from bond market players are not, 
in toto, significant relative to total contributions. As 
Rasmusen & Ramseyer [1994] indicate:
Legislators in modern democracies (a) accept bribes that 
are small compared to the value of the statutes they pass 
... [p. 305]
It is apparent that the awarding of bond issues is a 
situation where the office-holder is handling a public 
resource, and that the office-holding agent is motivated 
toward siphoning off the largest fraction of that 
resource possible without incurring penalties. One 
method of siphoning off resources is to trade influence 
over the underwriter selection process (an action usually 
unobservable to the public) for campaign contributions.
Equally, the underwriter is motivated to secure as 
much underwriting business as possible at the least cost 
possible. As might be expected, competitive bidding is
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not the most efficacious method for him: the underwriter 
would prefer negotiated placement, which effectively 
removes competition from the process of determining 
interest costs. The underwriter is motivated to make 
campaign contributions to garner uncontested business by 
the fact that the contribution is less costly than the 
reduction in profits caused by competitively bid 
business. It is also possible, as discussed previously, 
for officials to create a "pay to play" environment. In 
this environment competition for bond business is limited 
to a select pool of bond market players. The included 
players have a significant advantage over those not 
included in the pool of available transaction partners.
Using either theoretic perspective highlights the 
issue at hand; do underwriters and candidates behave in 
the manner predicted? As is evident from the cited 
articles in the business media and the interest in 
regulation indicated by the convening of several federal 
investigative committees, the common perception is that 
players in the bond market do participate in influence 
peddling.
C . Data Sources
This study requires data about several disparate 
roles and the individuals filling those roles. Data
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 5
concerning the sources and amounts of campaign 
contributions to candidates for public office, the number 
of issues and dollar volume of bonds placed with the 
various underwriting firms is required as are the 
identities and contributory activities of other players 
in the bond marketplace. In the interests of clarity, 
the discussion of data elements and sources is segregated 
by player role.
1. Elected Officials
As elucidated above, politicians are perennially in 
search of campaign funds. The information relevant to 
this study is directly related to the success or failure 
of that search: that is, data regarding contributions 
received. Federal and state election regulations mandate 
the filing of campaign finance statements which provide 
detailed listings of contributions. These documents 
should be readily procurable for all states, however this 
study will be restricted to Louisiana.
Given the vast number of elective offices contested 
in elections scattered across the calendar and around the 
state, the study focusses on elections for state office 
only. This focus should facilitate data availability and 
precision since local election data is often delayed, 
discarded more quickly, and of questionable accuracy.
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While it could be argued that a large fraction of tax- 
free government bond issues are locally designed and 
placed, the surge in creation of state oversight 
commissions in recent years ameliorates the influence of 
local officials. Further, market players seek to maximize 
their business transaction volume (both dollar volume and 
number of transactions), and thus are motivated to focus 
their efforts on officials having influence over multiple 
transactions. To further focus the data set, elective 
offices most likely to possess influence over the bond 
placement decision are investigated. Those positions are 
listed in table 1.1. The Representatives and Senators 
chosen, as well as the Treasurer, Governor, and Attorney 
General are all members of the LBC. The Lieutenant 
Governor and Secretary of State are included as well, 
under the hypothesis that their offices possess 
significant political power.
The selection criteria tend to accentuate any 
relation found between contributions and placement, 
payments to candidates not as likely to exercise 
influence over the bond issuance process are excluded. 
This strategy ameliorates the problem of non-targeted 
influence (the situation where other influence seekers 
attempt to purchase generic suasion over elected
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officials). That exclusion also functions to contract 
the pool of large contributors and thus highlight those 
attempting to influence placement decisions. It should 
be noted, however, that this restriction obscures a 
potentially large influence effect. It is probable that 
some officials with influence over bond placement 
function as indirect influence hubs. That is, their 
influence may be purchased by contributions to the 
campaigns of supporters, relatives, or even opponents.7 
Given the tenuous, continuously changing and largely sub 
rosa nature of such relations they are left out of this 
analysis. Subsequent research attempting to highlight 
relationships in this area will need to be extremely 
sensitive to contextual issues, a task that is clearly 
beyond the scope of this project.
Data required with respect to political offices for 
this study include contribution amounts, source, source 
affiliation, and recipient. All of this information is 
available in gross form in the required filings.
7I refer, of course, to the widely circulated story that 
Edwards' 1991 gubernatorial campaign found some method of 
providing funds for Duke's campaign in hopes (realized, 
as it turns out) that Duke would draw enough support away 
from Roemer to force a runoff between Edwards and a 
candidate he could beat, Duke.
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In order to restrict contribution data to those most 
likely to be quid pro quo in nature a floor amount for 
individual contributions is established. Contributions 
under that floor amount will not be incorporated into the 
analysis. The rationale for doing so is that influence 
is probably not sold cheaply. Following the strictures 
of competitive markets and agency theory discussed above, 
candidates are strongly motivated to maximize the price 
of any influence they seek to peddle. Further, even 
determined attempts to evade the intent of disclosure 
regulation would be unlikely to resort to having myriad 
individuals donate small amounts, as the logistics of 
such a ploy would rapidly become unmanageable. For this 
study the floor amount is set at $250, the maximum 
allowable contribution under the MSRB's Rule G-37. That 
amount should be large enough to limit the volume of 
contributions to manageable proportions and small enough 
to capture most if not all influence purchases.
2. Underwriters
Hildreth [1993] speaks solely to the issue of 
underwriter contributions to campaigns, as does all 
pending regulation. As Hildreth suggests, underwriters 
are motivated to develop exchange relationships with 
elected officials capable of influencing bond placement
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decisions. Determination of the existence and nature of 
the relation between contributions and that influence 
rests on two issues.
First, the volume of underwriting business (both in 
dollars and number of issues) of each underwriter needs 
to be tabulated. This information is available from the 
recorded proceedings of the agency responsible for 
placement of the issue. In Louisiana, the information is 
also available at the Louisiana Bond Commission. 
Additionally, supplementary documentation relating to 
bond placement issues is procurable and may be used to 
fill gaps in data from government records.
The one limitation of data availability is related 
to multi-underwriter issues. The exact apportionment of 
dollar volume to specific underwriters may not be 
available, as negotiations between the lead underwriter 
and other members of the underwriting pool are not part 
of the public record. This is a minor issue, however, as 
it is the lead position that carries the most influence 
over distribution and the identities of all underwriters 
are always readily available.
Second, a critical link is the association between 
underwriting business and contributions. Contributions 
can be masked in a variety of ways. The most common
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methods of masking contributions are to have them made by 
"related parties" who are not under constraints limiting 
contributions. For purposes of this study, related 
parties includes company PACs, employees and the families 
of employees.8 Information about employees of 
underwriting firms will be acquired by determining the 
underwriting firm office handling the issue and reviewing 
business directories for the cities in which the offices 
are located, as said directories routinely list employees 
by office location. While the task of connecting 
contributor and beneficiary is an arduous one, the 
candidate, prior to using her influence, would want to 
independently verify the promised contributions as well. 
This indicates that the driving force behind 
contributions is fairly easily determinable. In support 
of that theory, consider the statements Harlan [1993] 
attributes to spokesmen for Kathleen Brown and Mary
®Family members are defined as individuals listing the 
same address and/or the same surname. While there are 
obvious problems with using address or surname as a 
linkage device, I believe the effects on this study are 
minor. This belief rests upon the facts that this study 
deals with state elections (which limits the 
possibilities of surname repetition by reducing the 
population of interest and limiting the area of possible 
residence) and large contributions (which places limits 
on inclusion by virtue of the relatively greater wealth 
required to support large contributions). Both of these 
factors should minimize distortion of results.
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Landrieu, state treasurers of California and Louisiana 
respectively:
(Brown) "[A]bout 8% of the contributions to her 
1990 statewide campaign came from bond firms."
(Landrieu) "[S]he tries to limit bond-related 
contributions to about 20% of her total campaign funds."
If other office-seekers are as aware as Landrieu and
Brown seem to be of the ultimate sources of their
campaign funding, it seems likely that outside data
collection and analysis can produce similar results.
Assuming that these sorts of transactions do not
encourage trust simply makes that eventuality more
likely.
Third, information about the nature of the placement 
will be collected. Specifically, whether the issue was 
placed by competitive bid or negotiation. Negotiated 
placement makes quid pro quo arrangements easy to 
fulfill, therefore collecting this information should 
allow more conclusive analysis of the relation between 
elected official and underwriter. Further, net interest 
cost (NIC) data will also be collected for each issue.
The purpose in collecting NIC data will be to determine 
whether the bonds were issued at a market equivalent rate 
or not. Bonds issued at higher than market equivalent 
rates provide evidence consistent with influence
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peddling. Market equivalence will be proxied for by a 
combination of the following: size of issue, Moody's 
rating of the issuing entity, date of issue (as evidenced 
by bond purchase agreement signature date), risk limiting 
devices (insurance, guarantee, etc.), term of the 
investment (measured by years to first call) .
Since all issues under study were issued by 
Louisiana entities, no adjustment for exogenous regional 
economic factors is included. Bond investors are much 
more likely to be concerned with long-term economic 
factors, and those factors arguably will influence all 
issues from the area similarly. That is, investors are 
more likely to see Louisiana as an economic whole than to 
dissect it into smaller entities when looking at overall 
economic conditions that would influence investment 
choices. This is not to say that investors equate New 
Orleans Airport Commission debt with that of the Bossier 
Parish Water Districts, but rather to suggest that when 
investors consider longer term economic trends (e.g., 
continued viability of American oil production or long 
term market demand for chemical feedstocks produced by 
Louisiana chemical manufacturers) they do not 
differentiate across the various political subdivisions.
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D. Summary
This chapter has identified the research question 
addressed by the study: is there a relationship between 
bond player contribution activity and the public cost of 
municipal debt [NIC] ? An explanation of the bond 
issuance process is provided, and the various parties to 
the transaction are identified.
The chapter also provides a theoretic analysis of 
the hypothesized behaviour, based upon both competitive 
markets theory and principal-agent theory. Following the 
discussion of theoretic backing, an assessment of data 
required to investigate the question of interest is 
presented. Three distinct datasets are identified: (1)
contributions made to campaigns of candidates for the 
offices identified above; (2) details of issuance 
transactions for bond issues included in the study; and 
(3) financial information for each of the entities 
issuing bonds included in the study. Sources for each of 
the datasets are identified, as is the method of 
associating individual contributions with bond market 
player firms.
There is a rich tradition of research focusing upon 
the nature of the municipal bond marketplace. That
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tradition, as enumerated in chapter 2, serves as the 
baseline for this research.
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Chapter Two
Review of Literature
Relevant research studies investigating the primary 
municipal market can be partitioned into two categories: 
(1) those comparing results of negotiated versus 
competitive placement of the issue and (2) those focusing 
on the association between accounting information, 
financial report presentation and net interest costs.
The competitive placement process begins with the 
issuer (usually with the assistance of financial and 
legal consultants) establishing maturities, interest 
rates, and minimum yields for the issue, preparing a 
preliminary official statement of offering, setting a 
sale date and obtaining a rating. The issue is then 
offered for sale to underwriters, who make sealed bids 
for the issue. Per the axioms of market theory, this 
process should ensure that the issuer is able to maximize 
the price at which the issue is sold to underwriters. 
Underwriters, of course, seek to maximize their returns 
by selling at a maximal price to investors. Therefore, 
underwriters are willing to pay more for bond issues that 
investors find attractive, and competition among the
36
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underwriters should prevent them from extracting undue 
rents from either issuers or investors.
Negotiated issues, on the other hand, lack that 
competition between underwriters. In this method of 
placement, the issuer solicits proposals from various 
underwriters prior to setting characteristics of the 
issue.1 The underwriter and issuer agree that the 
underwriter will purchase the issue at a set price. 
Obviously, this method of placement allows issuer 
officials much greater latitude to shift business to or 
from players. The issuer is no longer afforded the 
advantage of market driven monitoring of the transaction. 
That is, the transaction price is set via negotiation 
rather than the market, allowing collusion between 
players and issuers and offering opportunities for 
extraction of excess rents by the underwriter.
Other participants to the bond issuance transaction 
may also be susceptible to contribution extraction by 
elected officials. Bond counsel, financial consultants, 
and various advisors to the process all profit from 
inclusion in the issuance transaction. Placement method 
is not directly related to the inclusion of these
*Note that the solicitation process is usually not formal 
and may not take place at all, especially in situations 
where undue influence is being exercised.
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individuals, as they tend to be selected prior to the 
decision about what kind of placement would be 
appropriate. The selection process for these players is 
typically specified by state or local acquisition 
regulation [e.g., the entity may require bid solicitation 
for legal services and advisory services]. Fees for 
services are also often capped by regulation, which 
limits the ability of advisors to trade political 
contributions in exchange for excess fees.2
Studies of placement method, focussing on 
underwriter selection and thus on a primary means of 
influence peddling, are especially relevant to this 
research. Researchers and regulators hypothesize that 
political influence peddling is facilitated by negotiated 
placement - that is, that directing business toward 
certain market players is easier in a non-competitive 
environment [Hildreth 1994, Roberts 1994, Levitt 1993, 
Harlan 1993, Hildreth 1993, SEC 1994]. This theory leads 
to the idea that incorporating a variable for placement 
method in the research model would mask any significance 
associated with political contribution variables.
2This is the case in Louisiana for bond counsel. Fees 
charged are constrained by state regulation specifying 
maximum fees by issue size.
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As recent studies have indicated (Simonsen &
Robbins, 1994), variation in interest costs over 
placement method choice has steadily narrowed over the 
last twenty years. This reduction in cost difference 
suggests that either players are foregoing the 
possibility of maximal rent-extraction as a means of de­
emphasizing the non-market nature of their transactions 
or that competition is occurring in the negotiated 
placement underwriter selection process. Hence, players 
appear sensitive enough to reputation effects that they 
maintain lower cost structures even under monopsony 
conditions. It seems possible, therefore, that the 
political contribution variable may overwhelm the 
placement variable.
Another factor of interest is the strong trend 
toward negotiated placement. As Simonsen and Robbins 
[1994] note, in 1970 83% of municipal bonds were sold via 
competitive placement: by 1993 only 20% were sold 
competitively. This switch towards negotiated placement 
has been portrayed as an after-effect of increasingly 
prevalent influence peddling.3 The studies discussed in 
this section seek to shed light on the phenomena of
3[Patterson 1993], [Cross 1993], [Levitt 1993], [Business 
Week 1993], [Hedges et al. 1993] are representative.
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placement and the various theories that have evolved to 
explain observed data.
A. Studies of Placement Method
One of the original items of interest to researchers 
was the notion that some issuers of tax-exempt securities 
have paid interest rates significantly above the market 
rate. The earliest research focussed on the effects of 
restrictive bidding practices. The most obvious practice 
is negotiated placement of a new issue rather than a 
competitively bid sale of the issue. This practice is 
often held out to be a necessary precursor to influence 
peddling, as the competitive bid process provides limited 
opportunity for shifting business to or away from 
specific market players. As Hildreth [1993] notes, 
however, influence may be in the form of "pay to play4" 
rather than outright award of business. At any rate, 
studies investigating the effects of competitive versus 
negotiated placement have a history dating back to the 
1960s.
The initial study of monopsony in the municipal bond 
market, West [1966], used a regression model to
4That is, players wishing to be "qualified" as capable, 
able to handle business the size of a particular issue, 
and having "suitable depth of personnel" may be induced 
to contribute.
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approximate net interest cost for selected issues between 
1956 and 1963. West's model incorporated five 
independent variables: (1) a measure of the market 
interest rate, (2) issue size, (3) Moody's rating of the 
issue, (4) average maturity and (5) number of bids 
submitted for the issues. West found that all variables 
were significant predictors of net interest cost, and 
that issues with at least three bids submitted had lower 
interest cost. West interpreted his results as 
demonstrating that underwriters collude on issues 
receiving only one or two bids: that is, underwriters of 
sparsely bid issues exercised their comparative market 
power to extract larger than normal spreads from issuers. 
Importantly, said underwriters may not need to engage in 
explicit collusion to exercise their relative market 
power. Underwriters would not necessarily have to 
communicate with their competitors in order for collusion 
to occur. It would be sufficient for underwriters to be 
able to identify those issues which will not attract 
multiple bids, and for each underwriter (or subset of 
underwriters) to identify some segment of the limited-bid 
market to bid on.
Kessel [1971] approached the issue of interest costs 
via a closer look at the effects of differing numbers of
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bidders for an issue. His results demonstrate that the 
incremental benefits accruing to issuers receiving larger 
numbers of bids grow progressively smaller as the number 
of bids increases. Kessel's hypothesis is simple: since 
any new bidder's bid yield may be lower than the others, 
an issuer's expected interest costs decline as the number 
of bidders increases. Kessel also notes that as the 
number of bids increases underwriter spread decreases.
In agency theoretic terms, this indicates that the 
competitive bidding process is an effective monitor if 
sufficient players participate.
Ederington [1978] seeks to adjudicate between West's 
and Kessel's theories. While he explicitly states that 
the theories are far from mutually exclusive, he advances 
still another theory - competition among underwriters 
drives interest costs down (that is, underwriters become 
price-takers as the number of bids increases).
Ederington*s study dealt with public utility debt rather 
than municipal, tax-free debt, but his results - support 
for his competition hypothesis, weak support for Kessel's 
search theory and not much support for West's economic 
monopsony theory - should be readily transferable to the 
municipal market.
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Sorensen [1979] examines both competitive and 
negotiated placement issues, providing a comparison of 
interest costs across the two methods of placement. 
Sorensen's theory - that bond issues suffering from high 
demand uncertainty might pay lower interest costs when 
negotiated rather than competitive placement was used - 
is borne out by his analyses. The competitive sample was 
split into two groups by rating5, and the resultant 
interest costs were compared with negotiated issue 
interest costs. Sorensen found that issues receiving 
only one competitive bid actually paid higher interest 
costs than comparable negotiated issues. Issues 
receiving multiple bids were sold at significantly lower 
interest rates than comparable negotiated issues.
Sorensen therefore concluded that the issuer's decision 
about placement method should be driven by an analysis of 
market forces governing underwriter participation in the 
bidding process, as issues garnering less than three bids 
were likely to incur interest cost premiums if 
competitively bid.
sThe theory behind this is that issues with lower ratings 
suffer from higher demand uncertainty than higher rated 
issues. Sorensen asserted that this theory was 
buttressed by the readily observable fact that lower 
rated issues routinely sell at higher interest costs.
His interpretation is that a part of the higher interest 
cost is a result of demand uncertainty.
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Note that Sorensen's results suggest that there may 
be rational, market driven reasons (such as maximization 
of return) for selecting negotiated placement.6 This 
interpretation problematizes the current trend toward 
statutory requirement for competitive placement (as 
epitomized by New Jersey governor Jim Florio's recent 
mandate7). Sorensen's study thus brings into question 
the simplistic solution of requiring competitive 
placement as a way to prevent suasory behaviour.
Therefore it is important to establish the nature and 
magnitude of interest cost variations under present 
conditions prior to attempting to rectify the perceived 
problem.
Joehnk & Kidwell [1980] partition issue cost into 
two component costs: (1) underwriter spread and (2) 
reoffering yield. As they note,
Net interest cost (NIC) is the key measure of 
borrowing cost to the municipality since it indicates the 
effective rate that will be borne by the issuer. When 
measured in terms of yield (percent), these costs 
elements are additive for an individual bond to the 
extent that
NIC = Spread + Reoffering Yield [p. 223].
s[GF0A 1994] provides a succinct discussion of the 
benefits and disadvantages of negotiated sales.
7As cited by Dickson [1993], Florio's executive order 
stated in part that, "state-level issuers must select 
underwriters on the basis solely of price, as determined 
by sealed bids submitted after public notification."
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In their analysis Joehnk & Kidwell respond to the 
explanation for NIC variation most often offered by 
players - that underwriters of negotiated placement 
issues provide additional services not rendered by 
underwriters of competitive placement issues. Joehnk & 
Kidwell provide a set of carefully matched issues*, and 
look at the variation between competitive and negotiated 
NIC, underwriter spread and yield. Their findings are 
that negotiated issues' underwriter spreads average $1.48 
to $2.36 higher per $1,000 bond: an amount reasonably 
close to MFOA survey estimates of $2.02 to $2.21 per 
$1, 000 bond consultant fee experienced by competitive bid 
issuers. This increase in spread therefore seems to be 
of an amount to compensate underwriters for their 
increased efforts on negotiated issues. The higher yield 
(.23 to .27 %) thus appears to be unrelated to the 
additional work performed by negotiated issue 
underwriters. Note, however, that the higher yield could 
be related to the higher risk perceived to be associated
8Joehnk & Kidwell used the following criteria to match 
issues: (1) type of issue (general obligation or 
revenue), (2) Moody's agency rating, (3) sale dates were 
within two weeks of one another, (4) final maturity was 
at least ten years and issues could vary by no more than 
five years, and (5) par values of the issues varied by no 
more than 24 percent.
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with negotiated issues rather than an artefact of 
influence peddling.
Braswell et al. [1983] also address the issue of 
origination cost variation across negotiated and 
competitive placement issues. True Interest Cost9(TIC) 
is used as the dependent variable rather than NIC under 
the assumption that TIC is a more "correct" measure of 
issuer costs and thus will provide a more accurate 
picture of the variation between competitive and 
negotiated placements. Braswell et al. find a variation 
of approximately 18 basis points between negotiated and 
competitive TICs, and note that for the average size, 
maturity and TIC rates of their sample this translates 
into about $265,000 in cost difference. The size of the 
cost difference suggests that underwriters are extracting 
more than compensation for their additional labours. As 
Braswell et al. put it,
Surely, this more than offsets the value of the 
added origination services provided by negotiating 
underwriters that is not provided under competitive 
bidding, [p. 105].
Bland [1985] takes a different perspective, 
suggesting that variation in NIC rates is a function of
9True interest cost, a.k.a. internal rate of return or 
Canadian method, acknowledges the time value of money and 
has been advocated as superior to NIC as a metric for bid 
evaluation.
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issuer experience in the bond market as well as 
characteristics of the bonds. According to Bland, 
neophyte issuers lack the ability to competently 
negotiate with underwriters and thus settle for higher 
NICs than more experienced issuers would. This view is 
borne out by Bland's study. There is an experience 
effect, but it seems to stabilize after four bond issue 
experiences. Bland's research, then, indicates that 
there is a base level of competency which is reached on 
average after participation in four bond deals. Issuers 
with that base level competence are able to negotiate 
agreements that approach the NIC rates of those issues 
competitively bid by more than seven underwriters (that 
is, the most attractive investment rates). This study 
may be interpreted as suggesting that if influence 
peddling exists, it may not cause much of a NIC 
differential. Alternatively, influence peddling may be 
so pervasive over both competitive and negotiated issues 
that it is impossible to produce conclusive evidence as 
to its existence by comparing the two.
Another consideration is the corrective nature of 
the market. If the primary market yield differential is 
due to mispricing (sale at a price not supported by issue 
or issuer characteristics), there should be a
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
48
corresponding adjustment in the secondary market. Maese 
[1985] investigates this issue by utilizing a sample set 
composed of bonds for which secondary market data was 
available. The number of issues outstanding at any one 
time (over 45,000) and the unregulated, over the counter 
nature of transactions severely limits data availability 
in the municipal market. In this information sparse 
environment Maese was able to find secondary market data 
on 58 issues. Her analysis of primary market data 
confirmed earlier studies' findings that competitively 
placed issues with more than 2 bids were sold at 
significantly lower NIC rates.
Surprisingly, Maese's secondary market results 
indicate that no systematic price adjustment occurs for 
either competitively placed bonds with less than three 
bids or negotiated placement bond issues. This discovery 
supports the contention of some industry analysts that 
price differentials are due to characteristics of the 
bonds rather than intensity of bidding competition. In 
terms of political influence peddling, the study implies 
that either said peddling does not affect the price of 
bonds or that the value of peddling is seen to be an 
enduring characteristic of the bond issue.
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The issue of competitive versus negotiated issuance 
was revisited recently by Simonsen & Robbins [1994]. As 
with Braswell et al., Simonsen & Robbins approximate TIC 
rather than NIC with their model. Simonsen & Robbins get 
results in line with previous research - TIC for 
competitive issues is significantly lower than TIC for 
negotiated issues. The amount of variance is, as 
expected, greater for issues with more intense bidding 
competition.
Theoretically, this study's discussion of the bond 
market environment is somewhat troubling. Simonsen & 
Robbins accept with little discussion the arguments of 
defenders of negotiated sales, especially the assertions 
that negotiated sales are more suited to bonds with 
"unusual structures or other atypical features" [p. 28]. 
Their advocacy of competitive placement is largely based 
upon the idea that bond transactions must be above 
suspicion. This assertion may be entirely correct, but a 
more detailed look at the problem of influence peddling 
seems warranted prior to drawing such a conclusion.
Leonard [1996] provides another recent review of the 
negotiated versus competitive issuance question. His 
research investigates two issues: 1) do issuers maximize 
expected net benefits by rationally selecting the most
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efficacious method of sale and 2) is there a difference 
in yield between issues that can be solely attributed to 
the method of sale.
The first issue speaks directly to the moral hazard 
problem discussed in this document - are public officials 
maximizing their own utility or that of their 
constituency? Leonard finds, that:
An issue could be classified as having been sold by 
negotiation or competitive bidding using variables that 
measure issue size, credit risk, market conditions, and 
issue complexity, [p. 25]
His interpretation is that this finding is consistent 
with the "traditional" view of negotiated placement 
benefiting issuers most for issues with complex 
structure, issues from low credit rating issuers, larger 
issues, and issues brought to market during periods of 
market fluctuation. Thus negotiated placement may be 
portrayed as the optimal placement method, depending on 
the circumstances involved.
Leonard's second research question assesses the 
social cost of placement method by seeking a difference 
in yield attributable solely to placement method. His 
analysis found no difference in reoffer yields due to 
placement method. Further, the analysis suggests that 
competitive and negotiated issues should not be pooled
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into a common sample without properly specifying the 
regression equation (Leonard suggests pooled interactive 
regression techniques). The argument is that the 
influences of several explanatory variables are not
contiguous across the two placement methods.
Leonard succeeds in casting some doubt on the
results of earlier studies, perhaps as much for his
trenchant observation that the preponderance of earlier 
studies date prior to 1985 and thus arguably fail to 
reflect changes in market structure [e.g., an order of 
magnitude increase in refunding issues, a sharp increase 
in "special district" debt issuance, and much more widely 
available information sets] as for his refinements of 
regression techniques. Note, however, that the issue of 
more than minimal debt cost to the entity, and hence to 
its constituency, is not resolved. It is entirely 
feasible for competitively bid issues to go out at 
greater than optimal yields if the pool of bidders has 
been constrained artificially by public officials.
In summary, the literature investigating placement 
method provides mixed evidence, with no definitive 
support for any of the various theories proposed to 
explain variation in interest rates. Perhaps the most 
convincing explanation is that offered by Bland [1985]
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which suggests that a basic level of experience with bond
issues is the key factor in achieving lower interest
rates. Regardless, the political influence perspective
can be adapted to any of the above theories.
This research also seeks to understand the
connection between accounting information, auditing and
interest costs. As a precursor to building a model to
investigate those relations, a brief review of the
literature dealing with municipal bonds from an
accounting perspective is warranted.
B. Accounting Information Studies
Wallace [1981] brought the issues of external audits
and accounting information into the set of factors
associated with bond interest costs, which she measured
by NIC. While acknowledging that NIC calculations do not
account for the time value of money, Wallace suggests
that generally NIC will be in a monotonic relationship
with yield-to-maturity, and further that NIC has a well-
documented history as a metric in municipal bond studies
which greatly enhances generalizability of results. As
Wallace notes
Moreover, empirical support for the correspondence 
of NIC and yield in the period under study is 
provided by Kidwell [1977] . [p. 506] .
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The primary goal of this study was associating 
accounting variables with NIC, however Wallace chose to 
incorporate several variables previously determined to 
have significant explanatory power as well. Her model is 
an evolution of the models used in finance to explore the 
bond market, and contains both demographic and finance 
variables investigated in prior research. This approach 
adds credibility to the study, as readers can be assured 
that variables unique to her study are not merely 
proxying for previously discovered relationships.
Wallace's findings are that accounting and auditing 
variables do not significantly contribute to the 
explanatory power of the model investigating interest 
cost variation. She does find a relation between those 
variables and bond rating, which in turn is a significant 
explanatory factor for NIC. These results suggest that 
accounting variables may be an important factor in 
determining NIC differences across issues rather than 
determining NIC itself.
Wilson & Howard [1984] extend Wallace's [1981] 
study, using "improved research methods on a greatly 
expanded database" [p. 208]. Their results are largely 
similar, although they conclude that both accounting and
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auditing variables are related to bond ratings and to 
NIC.
Benson et al. [1984] focus on the regulatory 
environment of municipal financial reporting. The 
federal government has in the past largely been 
restricted from using the SEC to dictate municipal 
accounting and reporting practices by the Tower 
amendment, leaving regulation to the various states.
This environment enables the current situation where 
regulations differ markedly across states, adding further 
complexity to an already labyrinthine market structure. 
Benson et al.'s hypothesis is that stringent state 
regulation forces disclosure (and accuracy) that might be 
otherwise absent, and that the enhanced credibility of 
financial reports produced under more stringent 
regulation will be acknowledged by the market in terms of 
"more accurate" interest costs.
Obviously there is a multitude of conflating 
variables to be dealt with here. Interest costs may 
reflect the additional risk assessed to issuers whose 
poor condition becomes apparent under heightened 
disclosure, players may discount the effectiveness of 
various regulatory schema, or regulations may simply 
reinforce already present disclosure behaviour. Benson
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et al. acknowledge the weaknesses inherent in their 
research and attempt to ameliorate some of those 
weaknesses by performing additional analyses, but are 
unable to counteract the strong multicollinearity among 
their variables. Their conclusion is that accounting 
regulations do affect how accounting information is 
reported and interpreted but it is not possible (at least 
at present) to assess the magnitude or direction of 
effect on interest cost.
Apostolou et al. [1984] set out to test the 
association of a specific quanta of financial information 
- reporting of a surplus/deficit - with NIC of general 
obligation bonds issued by Minnesota municipalities.
Their objective is to "extend Ball and Brown's study 
[1968] to the municipal market" [p. 9]; that is, to look 
at the relationship between a single 'bottom line' number 
and security pricing. Apostolou et al. select annual 
surplus/deficit as the municipal equivalent of net 
income.
This study seeks to illuminate the similarities and 
differences between the equity securities market and the 
municipal debt securities market in terms of information 
usefulness. The results of this research indicate that 
"changes in the surplus/deficit are not associated with
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municipal accounting numbers (or at least general fund 
surplus/deficits) have less relevance to investment 
decisions than corporate accounting numbers.
Structurally, this may be because municipalities are not 
perceived as default risks in the same manner as private 
organizations, or it may be a recognition of the 
possibility of strategic behaviour on the part of 
municipal administrators looking for easy passage of a 
tax increase. As Apostolou et al. point out, their study 
does suggest that regulation of municipal reporting in 
order to increase uniformity of reporting practice may be 
beneficial to security purchasers.
Benson et al. [1986] also investigate the usefulness 
of accounting information to bond investors. Their 
hypothesis is that accounting information is 
differentially useful across the spectrum of risk 
categories. Risk categories are proxied for by ratings 
assigned to issues by Moody's.
Results of the study confirm the hypothesis to some 
degree. Accounting variables for bonds rated Al and A 
are demonstrated to have larger coefficients than Aaa and 
Aa in Benson et al.'s regression model, which also 
incorporates finance and economic variables. Further,
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more of the accounting variables have statistically 
significant coefficients in the Al/A sample. The 
insights gained from this research suggest that the 
common practice of treating municipal bond issues as 
homogenous with respect to accounting information may be 
concealing the significance of some of that information.
Feroz & Wilson [1992] also investigate the 
differential influence of accounting information, but 
look for differences across market segmentation. Their 
hypothesis is that the association between the quality 
and quantity of financial disclosure and interest costs 
is stronger for entities issuing debt in local or 
regional markets than for those utilizing the national 
market. Note that Apostolou et al.’s [1984] theories may 
have some relevance here, as local and regional markets, 
by their number, inculcate more variation in disclosure 
practice than the (at least theoretically) market 
enforced comparability of information found in the 
national market. Therefore Feroz & Wilson's results 
arguably reinforce Apostolou et al.'s recommendation for 
more uniform disclosure regulation.
Feroz & Wilson's results support their differential 
information hypothesis. Their conclusions are that 
reporting quality is higher for entities utilizing the
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national market, but that market players are more 
sensitive to variations in quality and quantity of 
financial disclosure in the regional marketplace. This 
implies that entities using regional markets for debt 
issuance can significantly reduce interest costs by 
improving their financial disclosure (not necessarily 
'improving' the situation presented in those financial 
reports).
Brown [1993] develops an innovative approach to the 
problem of political entities' lack of a "bottom line." 
Brown [1993] proposes a method of assessing the financial 
condition of cities that arguably could provide just such 
a "bottom line" evaluation tool. Brown's assertions rest 
upon the idea that good financial health is a 
prerequisite for continued provision of services to 
constituents, and further that financial health may be 
assessed by establishing an entity's financial strength 
relative to other entities of similar size [as measured 
by population]. Brown [1993] uses ten ratios [calculated 
from information available from the entity's general 
purpose financial statements] to create his index. Brown 
[1993] uses a database maintained by the GFOA to compare 
key financial ratios of entities with those of hundreds 
of entities of similar size across the nation. One of
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Brown's innovations is a method of 'grading' an entity's 
ratios so as to create a "bottom line" equivalent for 
financial health of not-for-profit entities. Brown's 
study is an important innovation in the accounting 
information literature, and the Index he develops will be 
incorporated into this study's regression analysis.
C. Regression Model
The placement method, financial reporting practices 
and accounting information studies provide a thorough 
evaluation of the generic model underlying all of these 
studies. This generic model10 is composed of the 
following:
Dependent variable:
NIC Net interest cost
Independent variables:
Size Issue size to nearest thousand dollars.
This variable is scaled in thousands 
rather than millions because of the 
relatively small size of some local 
issues.
10See Table 2.1 for an indication of the degree of 
consensus among prior studies with respect to the 
components of the base model.


















Genealogy of The Base Model
Study: Interest Size YrsToCall Rating MktRate YrsToMat CorNIssue
West 1966 NIC $M Moody's Bond Buyer Yrs
Kessel 1971 NIC $K 5 Level S4P White's In(Yrs)
Ederington 1978 In(((bids) $M Indicator Moody's 2 wks prior
Sorensen 1979 NIC In($K) Yrs Moody's Salomon Avg Yrs 3 level
Braswell et al. 1983 TIC $M 2 level Moody's Bond Buyer Yrs 2 level
Maese 1985 NIC In($K) In(Yrs) Moody's Salomon 3 level
Bland 1985 NIC In($M) Moody's Salomon Avg Yrs
Simonsen & Robbins 1994 TIC Vector Vector Vector Oregon Ind Vector 3 level
Wallace 1981 NIC Moody's Bond Buyer Yrs J( bids
Wilson 4 Howard 1984 NIC Moody's Bond Buyer . 1 (Yrs) In (((bids)
Benson et al. 1984 NIC $K 2 level Moody's Salomon In(avg yrs) In (((bids)
Apostolou et al. 1984 NIC Moody's wkly Region In(avg yrs)
Benson et al. 1986 NIC $K 2 level Moody's Salomon Avg Yrs In (((bids)
Feroz & Wilson 1992 NIC 2 level Moody's Bond Buyer
o>O
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YrsToCall Time until the issue can be called (in
years). This variable measures the 'yield 
lock in period' of the issue.
Rating Moody's rating, if available, for the
entity and/or issue.
MktRate Comparable market interest rate for the
week of sale. The Bond Buyer Twenty Bond 
Index will be used.
CorNIssue Competitive or negotiated placement. This 
will be a categorical variable set to 1 if 
competitive and 0 if negotiated or 
privately placed.11
The dependent variable selected, NIC, was chosen to 
facilitate comparability between this research and prior 
studies. As [Simonsen & Robbins 1994] note, true
interest cost (TIC) is a measure of interest cost that
incorporates the time value of money and thus is arguably 
a more precise metric of interest cost. However, NIC is 
routinely used by players in the market, and, when 
accompanied by suitable constraints on rate variation and
uThis variable may be supplanted by the number of bids 
received for the issue for competitively placed issues if 
I can get that information.
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payment timing12, can approach TIC in usefulness as a 
measure of interest cost. Further, TIC data will be 
collected (if possible) and the model may be run with 
each as a check on the possible imprecision of the NIC 
model.
The base model, by design, does not include several 
of the variables found significant in prior studies. 
Brown's Index, which is incorporated into the expanded 
model, arguably encompasses several of these variables, 
including most if not all of Wallace's [1981] accounting 
variables, Apostolou et al.'s [1984] surplus/deficit, and 
some of Wilson & Howard's [1984] accounting variables.
D . Summary
This chapter has discussed extant literature 
investigating the factors influencing the public cost of 
debt financing [NIC]. The evolution of that literature 
is traced from West's original study of monopsony in the 
bond market to Leonard's current work suggesting that the 
bond marketplace has changed in nature as well as in 
volume.
The literature relating to accounting information in 
the bond market is also discussed. Results of the
“Common constraints include limits on the timing of 
interest payments and limits on the variation in interest 
rates across various maturities among others.
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various studies suggest that the utility of accounting 
information to participants in the bond market is not 
easily measured, in part because the entities in 
question, parishes, municipalities and districts, are not 
profitmaking institutions and thus cannot be evaluated 
via "bottom line" analyses. As a means of dealing with 
that issue, Brown's Index is proposed as a more 
appropriate measure of entity financial health.
This study proceeds by utilizing the regression 
model presented in this chapter to investigate the 
relationship between the factors of interest and debt 
cost [NIC]. Before regression can profitably be used for 
this research some indication of the existence and 
strength of the relation between contributions and bond 
business needs to be provided. Toward that goal, the 
analyses described in chapter three will be performed.
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Chapter Three
Methodology
This chapter discusses the methodology of the study. 
Section one presents the research question. The second 
section develops hypotheses based on that question. The 
third section discusses research design and possible 
threats to validity, and explains testing of the 
hypotheses. Finally, section four summarizes the 
material contained in the chapter.
The municipal debt market, as noted in chapter one, 
is presently the subject of much scrutiny. Regulatory 
agencies are studying the market and simultaneously 
attempting to alleviate perceived weaknesses in that 
market via additional regulation. Often this regulation 
addresses issues that are in the limelight as a result of 
widespread media attention, which suggests that it is 
media focus rather than public policy that drives much of 
the regulatory environment. Further, it is entirely 
possible that the issues regulators seek to address are 
not amenable to regulatory solutions.
This research project is intended to provide some 
empirical data concerning the issue of contributory 
behaviour by players in the municipal debt market,
64
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arguably one of the most-discussed aspects of the 
municipal marketplace. Additionally, this project will 
look at the completeness of the publicly available 
information set concerning municipal debt issues.
Finally, an attempt is made to assess the public cost of 
non-optimal debt placement decisions made by elected 
officials.
A. Research Questions
Formally stated, is there a statistically 
significant relationship between political contributions 
made by players in the bond market and the selection of 
those players as participants in the debt issuance 
process? Further, can the traditional municipal debt 
interest cost model be used to estimate the public cost 
of that relationship? Finally, can the traditional 
model for determining interest cost of municipal debt, 
with the addition of relevant variables, provide a 
measure of the value of entity financial information to 
purchasers of the securities?
B. Statement of Hypotheses
These questions are operationalized via the
following hypotheses [stated in the null form]:
Hx Bond market players are not major sources of
contributions for publicly elected officials exercising 
control over the bond issuance process.
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H2 The distribution of the size of player
contributions to the campaigns of elected officials is 
less than or equal to that of non-players.
H3 Contributions to these officials have no
correlation with the type of placement selected.
H4 The independent variables included in the base
model [market interest rate, face amount of debt, rating 
of the issuer, first call characteristics, and placement 
type] do not have significant explanatory power for NIC.
H5 Contributions by bond counsel involved in the
issuance process do not have significant explanatory 
power for NIC.
H6 Contributions
issuance process do not 
power for NIC.
H7 Contributions
issuance process do not 
power for NIC.
H8 Brown's Index of financial well-being does not
have significant explanatory power for NIC.
H9 Issuing entity compliance with state reporting
requirements does not have significant explanatory power 
for NIC.
H10 The issuing entity's last audited financial
report being dated 12 months of the issue's sale date 
does not have significant explanatory power for NIC.
1. Hypothesis One
The bond market is often portrayed as an environment 
amenable to moral hazard. That moral hazard is 
epitomized by the ability of elected officials to award 
bond business to market players contributing to their 
election campaigns. As explained in chapter one, it 
seems reasonable to expect those elected officials to
by underwriters involved in the 
have significant explanatory
by all parties involved in the 
have significant explanatory
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maximize their expected gains by seeking contributions
from all possible sources. Therefore, one method of
gauging the likelihood that officials are falling prey to
moral hazard is to determine the total amount of
contributions received from market players in relation to
that received from all sources. The hypothesis
investigated is expressed as follows:
Hfll Contributions by bond market players will
account for more than 10% of total contributions received 
by campaign funds of candidates for offices prospectively 
able to influence bond issue business.
The choice of ten percent as a cutoff point for 
differentiating between significant and non-significant 
campaign funds sources was based on discussions with 
various interested parties. Those involved in campaign 
financing suggested that ten percent would certainly 
direct their [and thus their candidate's] attention to 
the contributors as an important interest group. The 
perception of bond market players as an important 
interest group certainly facilitates the perspective of 
bond market players as possible trading partners in the 
market for favours.
Staff at the SBE likewise agreed that contributions 
of ten percent or more arising from a single interest 
group [that is, from bond market players] would be likely 
to generate attention by candidates. From their,
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regulative, perspective, that amount would probably 
warrant direct attention from the candidate. In line 
with those intuitions, hyopthesis one incorporates the 
ten percent figure.
2. Hypothesis Two
A second measure of elected officials succumbing to 
moral hazard in the bond issuance process is the size of 
contributions made by bond market players. As above, it 
seems reasonable that candidates for office attempt to 
maximize their gains by extracting as much as possible 
from each contributor. Given market players' 
expectations of significant income from non-competitively 
awarded business, it would be rational for them to 
contribute heavily, as discussed in chapter one. A 
testable version of that hypothesis is expressed as 
follows:
The distribution of the size of market player 
contributions to officials in a position to exercise 
influence is significantly different from that of non­
players, and that difference is skewed toward larger 
contributions.
3. Hypothesis Three
The market-driven nature of the competitive bidding 
process suggests that it would be much easier to award 
bond issue business outside "least cost" parameters via 
negotiated placement than via competitively bid
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placements. Officials seeking to dispense influence are 
thus motivated toward negotiated placements rather than 
competitively bid placements. This perception is reified 
by the rising tide of state legislation mandating 
competitive bidding, and by the wealth of research 
investigating net interest cost variance across placement 
method.
The use of negotiated placement is not, however, eo
ipso evidence of influence peddling. As discussed by the
Government Finance Officers Association [GFOA 1994], the
State Bond Commission of Louisiana [LSBC 1995], and the
California Debt Advisory Commission [CDAC 1992], there
are a number of factors to be considered in the placement
method process. This study assumes that the variance of
those factors across the bond issues included in the
sample is representative of the total population of
Louisiana bond issues. The factor of interest here is
the correlation of placement method and player
contributions. A testable version of the above is:
HM Contributions made by players involved in bond
issuance transactions are significantly related to 
placement method.
4. Hypothesis Four
As discussed in chapter two, there is a rich 
tradition of research using regression analysis to
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explore various aspects of the municipal debt issuance 
process. This project seeks to take advantage of that 
tradition by utilizing a base regression model developed 
by aggregating the variables common to much of prior 
research in the area:
NIC = Size + Rating + MktRate + YrstoCall + CorNissue 
Hypothesis four tests the applicability of that generic 
model to Louisiana bond issues.
Hm  The independent variables included in the base model 
possess significant explanatory power for Net Interest 
Cost
There are several differences between the datasets 
routinely used by prior research and that used in this 
project. First and foremost, previous research, largely 
conducted in the 70's and 80's, focused on relatively 
large issuing entities and relatively large issues. This 
focus was driven by a lack of information on smaller 
issues, and the truism that the gain to be had from 
information about larger issues is larger than that 
arising from information about smaller issues. The 
preponderance of prior research used bond issue 
information derived from commercial information sources 
such as The Bond Buyer, a daily industry newspaper, and 
was thus limited to information available to those
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sources [usually information about issues large enough to 
be traded somewhat actively].
By contrast, this project uses information collected 
from state agencies, thus providing a much more complete 
mix of both large and small issues, offered by both large 
and small entities. Using a more complete mix of large 
and small issues means that the sample more closely 
matches the municipal debt investment marketplace, and 
perhaps more closely mirrors the information sparse 
environment of that marketplace. Smaller issues also 
tend to be traded less frequently, which compounds the 
lack of readily available information by limiting the 
amount of transaction information available. Given the 
significantly reduced information set, the generic model 
should possess lower explanatory power over this sample 
than evidenced in previous research studies.
Secondly, prior research tended to utilize 
information from issues originating in various geographic 
and political areas, largely because of the information 
limitations mentioned above. This project breaks from 
tradition in that regard, restricting data as it does to 
issues originating in the state of Louisiana. While some 
constraints on generalizability of results is endemic to 
that restriction, focusing on a single political entity
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is necessary to an investigation of an inherently 
political phenomenon.
5. Hypotheses Five - Seven
After looking at the relationship between 
contributions and bond business from a macro level 
[hypotheses one - three], the intent of this project is 
to localize on the public cost of that relationship. The 
public cost of any influence exercised on the bond 
placement process by elected officials is likely to be 
impounded within the cost of debt issuance [that is, net 
interest cost]. The base model developed by prior 
researchers is used as a framework to investigate the 
influence of contributory behaviour on net interest cost.
This investigation is partitioned into several 
segments, seeking to provide information relating to the 
various players in the bond market and their respective 
contributions. Hypothesis five relates to contributions 
made by bond counsel:
Has Contributions made by bond counsel involved in
an entity's debt issuance have significant explanatory 
power for Net Interest Cost.
Hypothesis six speaks to contributions from underwriters:
Ha6 Contributions made by underwriters involved in
an entity's debt issuance have significant explanatory 
power for Net Interest Cost.
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Hypothesis seven aggregates contributions from bond 
counsel/ underwriters, and consultants to the issuance 
process:
HA7 Contributions made by market players involved
in an entity's debt issuance have significant explanatory 
power for Net Interest Cost.
These hypotheses, taken as a group, will provide some 
evidence concerning the effects of contributions on Net 
Interest Cost, and thus the effect on cost to the rate- 
paying public.
6. Hypothesis Eight
As mentioned previously, the municipal debt 
marketplace is often described as information asymmetric, 
in the sense that financial information about issuing 
entities is often limited, out of date, or simply 
unavailable. Hypotheses eight through ten explore the 
effects of that dearth of information.
Financial reporting for governmental entities is 
often considered more arcane than that of profit oriented 
organizations, simply because there is no clear measure 
of goals met. Governmental entities are not seeking to 
maximize reported profits, but are seeking to provide 
services for their constituents and other designated 
individuals. There is, therefore, no "bottom line" 
equivalent for governmental entities. Government finance
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professionals often remark upon this lack of a "bottom 
line" as one of the inherent limitations in manager 
[investor] interpretation of entity financial reports.
Brown [1993] provides a method of calculating an 
index of financial health based upon data available from 
an entity's General Purpose Financial Statements]. The 
data is then evaluated by comparison of entity financial 
data with that of similarly sized entities from across 
the nation and expressed as Brown's Index of Financial 
Health. Table 3.1 presents the components of Brown's 
Index.
While the assertion that financial health can proxy 
for the admittedly difficult to measure attribute of 
success at provision of services, it is much less 
troublesome to utilize Brown's Index as a measure of the 
attractiveness of an entity's debt offerings. That is, 
the municipal debt market, by all accounts, follows 
closely the corporate debt market in paying attention to 
financial health.
Brown's Index, relying as it does on comparative 
indicators, may function as a proxy for a more complete 
information marketplace. Hypothesis eight utilizes 
Brown's Index as follows:
Ha8 Brown's Index of financial well-being has
significant explanatory power for NIC.




1. T1 Revenues / Population
2. T1 General Fund Revenues [own sources] / T1 General 
Fund Sources
3. General Fund Sources [from other funds] / T1 General 
Fund Sources
4. Operating Expenditures / Tl Expenditures
5. Tl Revenues / Tl Expenditures
6. Unreserved General Fund Balance / Tl General Fund 
Revenues
7. Tl General Fund Cash & Investments / Tl General Fund 
Liabilities
8. Tl General Fund Liabilities / Tl General Fund 
Revenues
9. Direct Long-Term Debt / Population
10. Debt Service / Tl Revenues
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7. Hypothesis Nine
Local government financial reporting in the United 
States is largely exempt from regulation by the 
Securities Exchange Commission, unlike that of publicly 
held corporations. This exemption from regulation leads 
to an environment where financial reporting is sporadic, 
and often driven by a need to issue debt rather than by a 
need to inform current investors or the public. In the 
absence of regulation by the federal government, more and 
more states have begun to mandate financial reporting by 
local entities. Typically, however, those states have 
been less willing to put teeth into their reporting 
statutes. That unwillingness to establish penalties for 
failure to provide continuing financial reports leads to 
a situation where the state mandates, for instance, 
annual audited financial reporting for all local 
governmental entities, but the costs of non-compliance 
with those mandates are trivial. Not surprisingly, many 
entities choose to ignore the state mandates and fail to 
produce regular audited financial reports.
Louisiana, as many other states, has legislation in 
place mandating continuing financial disclosure by 
governmental subdistricts. One measure of information 
availability, therefore, is an entity's compliance [or
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lack thereof] with state reporting requirements. 
Information as to an entity's compliance is available 
from the Legislative Auditor's office, and is included in 
materials prepared by that office for the LBC prior to 
each of the LBC's monthly meetings. Hypothesis nine, 
looking at the determinable value of entity financial 
information in the bond marketplace, can thus be 
expressed as:
HA9 Issuing entity compliance with state financial
reporting requirements has significant explanatory power 
for NIC.
8. Hypothesis Ten
One of the tenets of the theory of capital markets 
is that participants always act immediately on currently 
available information. Therefore, a test which places 
more emphasis on currency of information available in the 
bond market is indicated. Most states, Louisiana 
included, phrase their reporting requirement statutes 
such that entities need to produce audited reports on at 
most a biannual basis to be in compliance with the 
statutes. The capital market should be much more 
sensitive to timely information, and thus should demand 
[by way of interest costs] more current information.
One test of the availability of more timely 
information is to compare the date of the most recent
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audit report available with the sale date of the bond
issue. Note that sale date of the issue is the date on
which the sale agreement is formally completed, and may
occur some time after the issue is conceived of. In some
cases, the sale date may be two or three years after
design and approval of the issue. Arguably, prospective
investors are concerned with current status of the
issuing entity rather than its financial health at some
point in the past. Therefore, investors should be
willing to pay a premium [in the form of lower interest
rates] for issues from entities producing continuing
financial reports. Hypothesis ten examines the existence
of that premium price and is expressed as:
HA1o The date of the entity's most recent audited
financial report being within twelve months of the sale 
date of the issue has significant explanatory power for 
NIC.
C. Research Design
The above hypotheses delineate the questions at the 
center of this study. Before they can be addressed in 
detail, some consideration needs to be given to research 
design and the various threats to validity caused by that 
design as well as how the study deals with those threats. 
The following discussion speaks to the issue of research
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design, and attempts to provide some guidance for 
interpretation and application of the study's outcomes.
Research projects in the social sciences are by 
definition studies of humans and their interactions, and 
thus much less amenable to quantitative rigour and 
replication than research projects in the physical 
sciences. Similarly, outcomes from social science 
research projects need to be interpreted with more 
attention to aspects of the study that may not be 
universal in nature.
One particularly troublesome aspect of much research 
in the social sciences, including the present study, is a 
reliance on archival data pertaining to situations that 
arguably may not be representative of the environment as 
a whole. This might be expressed more clearly as a lack 
of replicability. The use of archival data also limits 
the ability of researchers to provide the kind of 
experimental controls useful in minimizing validity 
concerns and maximizing generalizability of results, 
specifically randomization of samples and equivalence of 
control groups. Given that society is not now and is not 
likely to become static, and that archival studies can 
and do provide decision-useful information, researchers 
have developed a means of communicating about these
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issues that attempts to describe their content without 
exaggerating their generalizability. In the spirit of 
that communication, the following discussion of the 
study's research design is provided.
This study utilizes a research design referred to 
variously as "one-shot case study" [Huck et al., 1974] or 
"one group posttest only" [Cook & Campbell, 1979]. The
portion of the study looking at contributions is 
comparing two groups of contributors to the elected 
officials identified in chapter one: one composed of 
persons or firms in the bond business, and the other 
composed of everyone else. The second segment of the 
study focusses on bond issues, comparing a group of bond 
issues handled by those making sizeable contributions 
with a group of bond issues handled by noncontributors.
In neither case is it possible to have a control 
group,exogenous to the issues of interest, as a 
background metric for validation of the analyses 
provided.
Huck et al. [1974] suggest that this design is 
perhaps more appropriately referred to as a descriptive 
study than an experimental study. I have no quarrels 
with that assessment: the purpose of this study is to 
answer questions about whether an influence-peddling
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effect could be demonstrated by analysis of archival
data, not to explore causality. As they note,
[C]hanges in observations or measurement of the dependent 
variable cannot be attributed exclusively to exposure to 
the independent variable, [p. 228]
The point is well taken - this study does not purport to 
provide conclusive evidence as to the existence, or lack 
thereof, of influence-peddling. The study does attempt 
to find some evidence of that behaviour by looking at 
campaign contributions, which are widely suggested to be 
a primary vehicle for these transactions. As discussed 
in chapter one, the regulative approach has been to focus 
on those contributions: one of the principal objections 
municipal bond market players raise to recent regulation 
[MSRB Rule G-37] is the lack of evidence supporting 
regulators' assertions that influence-peddling is 
widespread. This study utilizes archival, publicly 
available data to provide an analysis of the relation 
between contributions and bond business.
Cook & Campbell [1979] take a less dismissive 
approach to what they refer to as "one-group posttest 
only" designs. They assert that experimental design is 
not the only, nor perhaps the most feasible, method of 
ruling out alternative interpretations, and continue by 
stating:
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This is especially the case when particular threats seem 
implausible in light of accepted theory or common sense 
or when the threats are validly measured and it is shown 
in the statistical analysis that they are not operating, 
[p. 96]
Given the nature of the relationship in question -
largely sub rosa, and only beneficial when it remains so
- and the fact that regulators can only be assured of
regulating transactions that are publicly -reported, it is
obvious that researchers attempting to address the issue
by analyses of multiple-transaction data are severely
limited in their ability to design research strategies
that would function to minimize threats to validity. The
ensuing discussion addresses the various threats to
validity identified by Cook & Campbell [1979] and is
semented in line with their taxonomy of research issues:
statistical conclusion validity, internal validity,
construct validity and external validity.
1. Threats to Statistical Conclusion Validity
As Cook & Campbell [1979] note, there are three
basic issues to be addressed with respect to covariation:
(1) Is the study sensitive enough to permit reasonable 
statements about covariation? (2) If it is sensitive 
enough, is there any reasonable evidence from which to 
infer that the presumed cause and effect covary? And (3) 
if there is such evidence, how strongly do the two 
variables covary? [p. 39]
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The first issue obviously relates to the power of the 
statistical analyses performed. The likelihood of of 
incorrectly concluding that correlation does not exist 
can be minimized by using larger sample sizes, setting a 
at a reasonable level, an using the highest power 
statistical tests available for the data at hand. This 
study addresses the issue of sample size by including 
every transaction for which data could be obtained, 
rather than attempting to randomly select a sample for 
the available data. As will be mentioned later in this 
section, that decision does have some implications for 
other validity concerns. The a for this study is set at 
.05, which is a level commonly used in research in this 
area. Given the truncated nature of the contributions 
data [contributions under $250 are discarded from the 
dataset], and the non-normal nature of the data, 
nonparametric statistical tests were selected. The 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and Kolomogorov-Smirnov two- 
sample test were chosen to test the hypothesis that 
contributions from the two groups [market players and all 
others] came from the same population. The Wilcoxon- 
Mann-Whitney test closely approaches the power of the 
parametric t-test [close to 95 percent], and in some
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cases may be more powerful. This test examines the 
central tendency of the two populations.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is sensitive to any kind 
of difference in distribution - skewness, dispersion, 
central tendency, etc. This test is a more conservative 
approach, therefore if the null is rejected using this 
test more confidence in the result is warranted [Siegel & 
Castellan, 1988].
Another concern is violation of assumptions 
underlying the statistical tests chosen. The most 
troublesome assumption made by tests used in this study 
is that of independence: that the observations are 
unrelated. Given that this study incorporates all 
available data from the state of Louisiana and its 
political subdivisions, it incorporates multiple 
contributions from individuals or corporations, and it 
also incorporates multiple bond issues from a single 
issuing entity. My rationale is that artificially 
truncating the dataset to enable conformance to the 
precepts of independence would give rise to more damaging 
problems of sample size and would damage the richness of 
the analysis. Conceptually, one may argue that 
contributions to candidates for different offices are 
unique, and that multiple contributions to a single
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
85
candidate may be summed to provide a fuller picture of 
the relative influence of the contributor.
The measures used in this study, contribution 
amounts, inclusion in the group of market players, NIC, 
and bond issue characteristics are also considered. A 
common problem with social science research is 
reliability of measures. The variables of interest in 
this study are all evidentially supported: contribution 
amounts and bond issue data are all exogenously 
determined. Classification of contributors as bond 
market players is accomplished by review of professional 
affiliations, materials intended to attract clients and 
past participation in bond transactions, and is therefore 
the best possible method of determining the 'true state' 
of the contributors included in the study.
Random irrelevancies in the environment can also be 
source of validity concerns. Attempts were made to 
reduce the risk of such irrelevancies by incorporating 
them, to the extent possible, into the analysis [e.g., 
the financial characteristics of issuing entitys are 
represented by Brown's Index, and fluctuations in the 
market are represented by the BB 20 Bond Index].
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2. Internal Validity Concerns
Internal validity speaks to the issue of determining 
whether there is a causal relationship between two 
covarying variables, and what the direction of that 
causality may be. This study does not address 
directionality, as for this study directionality is 
irrelevant. It is not discernable whether contributions 
relate to prior business awarded or future prospects of 
business awards, and extremely likely that contributors 
would not make contributions without some expectation of 
future gains commensurate with those contributions. 
Finding evidence of a relation between past business and 
present contributions would not disaffirm the 
hypothesized relation between contributions and bond 
business, but would suggest that bond market players 
possess more power in the relation than is commonly 
acknowledged.1 As the relation would be in evidence 
regardless of perceived directionality, the issue is not 
considered.
History and maturation address changes in the 
environment generated by causes exogenous to the
xBond market players responding ex post to business 
awards would imply that the market for influence is 
characterized by few bidders for money and many offerors, 
a characterization at odds with experience.
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analyses, and in this study could possibly instantiate in 
cases of multiple issuance by a single entity. Similar 
issues are raised by reference to selection, although in 
this case the threat is that there are differences 
between the issuing entities. The assertion of this 
study is in accordance with Bland's [1985] finding that 
issuers with more than four bond issuance experiences 
possessed a plateau of expertise in the process that 
enabled them to approximate competitively bid NIC via 
negotiated placement. Given that this study uses NIC as 
the dependent variable, it is reasonable to assert that 
entities are in very relevant ways equivalent with 
respect to bond issuance techniques. That equivalence is 
considered prima facie evidence that history, maturation 
and selection are adequately controlled for.
Importantly, determining the level of response a 
study should direct to internal validity concerns is a 
recursive and systematic process. First, researchers 
need to develop a sensitivity for ways in which those 
concerns may have influenced the data. Second, an 
examination of the data will assist in determining which 
of the threats need to be addressed directly. Finally, 
when all possible threats have been ruled out, one may 
draw conclusions. Those conclusions may provide input to
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further thought about one or more issues may be 
influencing the data.
As Cook & Campbell explain, one avenue of addressing 
these concerns is via the plausibility of alternative 
explanations implicit in recognizing said concerns. It 
may well be that alternative interpretations can be ruled 
out by consideration of their nature and implications. 
Chapters four and five of this study address alternative 
interpretations of study results. As with all archival 
research, the strength of causal inference in this study 
is not as robust as that produced by randomized 
experimentation.
3. Possible Threats to Construct Validity
Influence-peddling in and of itself is not amenable 
to measurement. A precursor to investigation of the 
phenomenon, therefore, is developing a measurable 
construct to represent that phenomenon which does not 
simultaneously measure other phenomena. That is, the 
possibility that alternative, equally probable 
explanations of observed phenomena exist.
In the situation of interest to this study, several 
factors operate to reduce the risk of threats to 
construct validity. One factor minimizing the risk to 
construct validity is the assumption that contributors
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are, in important ways, economic rational actors - that 
is, they do not gratuitously make contributions, but 
rather are motivated to do so only by the prospects of 
some sort of reward. This self-interested behaviour on 
the part of contributors ensures that candidates need to 
dispense something in return for contributions; the 
relationship is quid pro quo.
Another factor limiting alternative explanations is 
the assumption that any influence purchased will be used 
where and when possible. Contributors are characterized 
as buying a route to the official's attention, rather 
than as purchasing specific instances of influence. This 
assumption functions to dismiss worries about the 
intended nature of influence, as any influence purchased 
is treated as pervasive. Alternative explanations 
focussed on specificity of intention are thus ruled out.
A final limiter of construct validity concerns is 
the study's nonconsideration of causal linkages. For 
purposes of this study, it is nonrelevant that the 
relation between contributions and bond business may be 
indirect and confounded with other variables, for 
instance friendship with the candidate. The present 
study does not attempt to establish causality, merely to 
demonstrate covariance.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
90
Concerns over construct validity are also addressed 
by the use of more than one test of the hypothesized 
relation. Contributions to candidates are considered in 
toto, and the distribution of those contributions is also 
investigated. Various alternative explanations for test 
results were also considered, for example, the 
possibility that the population of bond market players is 
wealthier than the general population of contributors. 
Results of the analyses tend to disaffirm this 
interpretation. Contributions by players, in toto or 
individually, do not appear to be inherently higher than 
those of the balance of the population.
4. Threats to External Validity
The key concern of researchers and consumers of 
research is typically the generalizability of research 
results. Note that generalizability across populations 
is different than generalizing to a well-defined target 
population, and that both may be desirable traits of 
research studies. This study attempts to provide 
information generalizable to player selection and bond 
issuance in the state of Louisiana. The further 
extension of that information to other states is subject 
to several limitations, which will be discussed in 
chapter five.
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Interactions between selection and the event of 
interest can produce biases in results of tests. For 
this study, interactions should theoretically be 
minimized, as all data examined was extracted from the 
public record - that is, no effort on the part of 
reporting entities was involved other than that necessary 
to comply with state and federal regulations. The use of 
public data may, however, incorporate some systemic 
recruitment factors. Primary among these is the tendency 
for those violating the law to fail to report information 
which might lead to public knowledge of their violations. 
In terms of this study, entities populated by 
opportunistic officials may choose to disobey reporting 
requirements. This factor should be minimized in the 
present study by virtue of the study's focus on statewide 
elections only. Obviously, the decision of a local 
entity to report or not is made by local officials, thus 
not directly made by the officials under consideration in 
this study. It is certainly true that methods of suasion 
may be exercised by state officials, but that practice, 
as that of influence-peddling, should be consonant with 
practices in the balance of the state.
There may also be interactions between setting and 
treatment. This study utilizes data from all issues
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reported/ and includes data from issuing entities of 
varying sizes, financial health, and economic climate.
The economic climate of the state, and the South in 
general, serve as a common background for all issues.
This section of the chapter has addressed validity 
concerns for the study as a whole. Concerns with 
specific hypotheses are spoken to as the hypotheses and 
results are presented. The next section of the chapter 
presents a discussion of the hypotheses individually, and 
places each within the the framework of this study.
5. Hypothesis Testing
Hypotheses one through three and five through seven 
rely upon data collected from campaign finance reports 
filed by candidates for election. While these reports 
are generated by the candidates themselves [or their 
funding committees], they are subject to audit by the 
Ethics Commission. This possibility of audit functions 
to discourage inaccurate reporting, and thus lends 
legitimacy to analyses based on this data. Data 
concerning cumulative contributions of $250 or more were 
collected for all candidates for the offices of interest 
[see table 1.1].
Determination of bond market players was made in 
accordance with the plan enumerated in chapter one.
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Underwriting, consulting and bond counsel firms and 
individuals were identified by several measures: review 
of the "Red Book" published by Thomson Publishing,
Moody's Municipal and Government Manual, compilation of 
firms actually having an association with the issues 
included in the sample, and review of business 
directories. Additionally, the Martindale-Hubble 
directory of attorneys was reviewed for attorneys 
specializing in bond-related matters.
Once the firms were identified, their employees were 
identified by perusal of city directories, yellow page 
advertisements of the firms [which routinely list those 
practicing under the firm's banner], and by reference to 
individual names appearing on various forms filed with 
the LBC. Affiliated persons [spouses, immediate family 
members] were identified by surname and/or address, both 
of which are required information on campaign 
contribution reporting forms.
Hypothesis one examines total contributions from 
bond market players [importantly, this is total player 
contributions, not just successful player contributions] 
as a fraction of total campaign contributions reported. 
Contributions of less than $250 are excluded from the 
calculations. The predicted result is that, for each of
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the offices selected, bond market player contributions 
total more than 10% of all contributions over $250.
Hypothesis two, concerning the distribution of 
player contribution sizes, tests for a difference between 
that distribution and the distribution of non-player 
contributions. Again, only contributions of $250 or more 
are considered. This hypothesis is tested by calculation 
of Mann-Whitney test statistics and Kolmogorov-Smirnov 2- 
sample Test statistics. Given the truncation of 
distribution inherent to using a level of the variable of 
interest to limit sample selection, it seems prudent to 
utilize non-parametric tests that should be less 
influenced by the normality of distribution.
Tests will be run on the aggregate of contributions 
to all selected offices, and also on individual offices. 
This should allow conclusions as to the pervasiveness of 
the behaviour under study, as well as allowing isolation 
on specific offices. The predicted result is that the 
distribution of player contributions is negatively skewed 
with respect to the distribution of all other 
contributions over $250.
Hypothesis three tests the relation between 
contributions by successful players [those actually 
participating in the issuance] and method of placement.
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As above, nonparametric test statistics are performed.
The prediction arising from the prior discussion of 
candidate motivations is that there is a postive relation 
between contributions and negotiated placement of bond 
issues.
A multiple regression model was used to test 
hyotheses four through ten. The regression model used is 
developed by reference to extant research examining 
municipal debt issues. As discussed in chapter two, Net 
Interest Cost is used as a dependent variable rather than 
True Interest Cost [a discounted cash flow measure] so as 
to maximize comparability with prior research and sample 
size [the state agencies requiring bond issue information 
reporting routinely collect NIC rather than TIC].
Additional variables are added to the model in an 
attempt to discern their significance with respect to Net 
Interest Cost, which is the primary public cost of debt 
issuance. These additional variables are incorporated 
singly and also in concert. All variables are subjected 
to analysis for covariance with other variables, as well 
as analyses intended to bring out the need for 
transformation of any of the variables.
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The additional variables are:
BCCont Contributions to candidates made by the
issue's bond counsel. This variable is 
the amount of contributions made by 
successful players rather than the total 
of all contributions by bond counsel.
UWCont Contributions to candidates made by the
issue's underwriters. As above, this 
variable is the amount of contributions by 
successful players only.
SumCont Total contributions made by all parties 
involved in the bond issuance.
Brown Brown's index calculated with scoring from
1 to 4 rather than -1 to 2. This
alteration was made so as to remove the 
possibility of an Index score of 0.
AudComp A categorical variable indicating the 
issuing entity's compliance [or lack 
thereof] with Louisiana reporting 
statutes, as reported by the Legislative 
Auditor.
LastAud A categorical variable indicating whether 
the entity's most recent financial
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statement at sale date was dated within 
the last twelve months.
Predictions of coefficient signs can be made based 
on the earlier discussions concerning market theory.
Each of these coefficients were tested against the null 
that there is no measureable effect on Net Interest Cost 
arising from either political contributions or 
availability and timeliness of financial information 







This chapter presents the research questions 
investigated by the study: Is there a relationship 
between political contributions and bond business? Is 
there a public cost [as measured by increases in Net 
Interest Cost] to those political contributions? Is 
there a relationship between issuing entity financial 
information availability and the cost of that entity's 
capital? Testable hypotheses are developed from these 
questions. Data collection methods are presented and
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parameters for sample selection are discussed The 
chapter also enunciates expected results, and details the 
statistical analyses performed.
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Chapter Four
Data Analyses
This chapter presents details of the analyses 
performed and discusses results of the study. The first 
section explicates data collection methods and provides 
descriptive information about the bond issues included in 
the sample. Section two presents analyses of the 
research hypotheses relating to campaign contributions. 
The third section discusses the regression model, and 
presents results of analyses investigating the publicly 
available information set. Finally, section four 
presents an extension of the regression analysis, with an 
eye toward the changing nature of the municipal bond 
marketplace.
A. Data Collection
Information required for this study is derived from 
several sources. All of the data sources rely upon 
publicly mandated information disclosure, which greatly 
facilitated data collection. All filings are also 
subject to review for accuracy by state agencies, which 
lends some assurance of reliability to those filings.
99
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1. Campaign Contributions
Contribution data was collected from filings with 
the State Board of Ethics for Elected Officials. The SBE 
requires candidates for office to file election finance 
reports for all elections in which contributions total 
$5,000 or more, the candidate disburses more than $5,000 
in campaign related expenses, or the election area 
comprises more than 250,000 constituents. Reports were 
available for all of the offices determined to be of 
interest to this study.
Campaign finance reports are required periodically 
throughout the election period, so there were several 
filings for each candidate. During the 1990 election 
cycle regulations mandated that reports be cumulative in 
nature: candidates were required to report not only the 
dollar amount of contributions as they were received but 
also the cumulative total of contributions from each 
contributor for the entire election cycle. This 
requirement has since been rescinded, making data 
acquisition for subsequent election campaigns 
significantly more difficult.
Transaction details were collected for all 
contributions greater than $250 [the maximum amount 
allowed under MSRB G-37]. Data collected included
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candidate to whom the contribution was made, cumulative 
amount contributed, and the name and address of the 
contributor. As discussed in chapters one and three, 
bond market players were identified by perusal of 
industry manuals, business directories and LBC records. 
The contribution dataset was then matched with player 
information to provide player contribution data by 
candidate. Table 4.1 provides an analysis of 
contributions partitioned by source.
2. Bond Issuing Entities
Louisiana, as other states, mandates financial 
disclosure by its political subdivisions. The office of 
the Legislative Auditor is charged with accepting and 
reviewing financial reports from the various entities, 
and is empowered to provide audit services to those 
entities unable or unwilling to procure them elsewhere. 
The Legislative Auditor's office also maintains a 
database of these financial reports, and provides reports 
to the LBC concerning compliance with state reporting 
requirements and the financial condition of entities 
seeking to offer debt.
Financial data necessary to compute Brown's Index 
were collected from the Legislative Auditor's repository 
of financial statements. As detailed in Table 3.1,



















Mean Mode Median Maximum Total $ This 
Source
Bond Counsel 1,395 500 600 10,000 224,541
Underwriters 2,105 5, 000 1,.000 5, 500 214,722
All Playersl 1, 708 1, 000 1, 000 10,000 462,943
Non-Players 1, 412 500 712 10,000 13,610,041
1 All Players includes bond counsel, underwriters, financial and other consultants.
O
1 0 3
Brown's Index is calculated from financial data available 
from the entity's general purpose financial statements 
[GPFS]. The Legislative Auditor's office also provides 
reports to the LBC concerning entity compliance with 
reporting statutes, and that information was gathered 
from monthly summaries prepared for the LBC.
3. Bond Issues
The LBC is charged with monitoring public debt 
arising from sub-districts of Louisiana, and must approve 
new issues prior to sale as a part of that monitoring 
process. The LBC must also approve appointments of bond 
counsel, financial advisors, underwriters, and other 
parties to the issuance [LBC 1995] . Therefore the LBC 
maintains records for each bond issue, including details 
of the transaction such as involved players, sale date, 
amount of the issue and Net Interest Cost. Data was 
collected for all issues mentioned in the minutes of the 
monthly meetings of the LBC.
Data concerning bond issues was also gathered from 
Thomson Publishing, publishers of the industry's daily 
newspaper, The Bond Buyer. Thomson collects data on 
larger issues, limiting its focus to those having a face 
value of more than $1 million. Data from both sources 
were combined, and issues with incomplete data were
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discarded. The final sample is composed of 290 issues. 
Descriptive data for the sample are presented in Table 
4.2.
Sample statistics do not, in general, mirror those 
of the publicly reported bond market. For instance, 
negotiated issues comprise nearly 80 percent of new issue 
debt according to the 1994 Bond Buyer Yearbook, but are 
56 percent of issues in this sample. 65 percent of all 
issues are revenue bonds, while 72 percent of this sample 
are. Mean issue size also varies, with the general 
population having larger means than this sample. There 
is a distinct relation between issue size and rating, 
with rated bonds accounting for 85 percent of the dollar 
volume of the sample but only 60 percent of the number of 
issues. Unrated bonds make up 40 percent of the sample 
by issue count, but less than 15 percent by face amount.
The sample is fairly consistently spread across 
issuing entity, with 23 percent arising from 
municipalities, 73 percent from parishes and under 5 
percent being state agencie issuances. This spread 
indicates that the sample is not being overpowered by 
state agency issues and thus reinforces the extensibility 
of the study to the general population of Louisiana bond 
issues.



















Total $ Vol Mean Issue $ K-S Z'/P N-ct % [N-ct/$]
Placement Method:
Negotiated 1,269,258,756 7,883,595 3.3384/.0000 161 55.5/56.2
Competitive 988,662,104 7,664,047 129 44.5/43.8
Issue Type:
Revenue 1,633,384,466 10,889,230 2.0342/.0005 150 51.7/72.3
General Obligation 624,536,394 4,460,974 140 48.3/27.7
Rating:
Aaa or Aa or A 1,592,318,715 16,084,027 5.5438/.0000 99 34.1/70.5
Baa or Lower 331,443,042 4,419,241 1.7179/.0055 75 25.9/14.7
Unrated 334,159,103 2,880,682 116 40.0/14.8
1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z statistic comparing the distribution of face value between the indicated groups and 





















T1 $ Vol Mean Issue $ K-S Z/P N-ct % [N-ct/$]
Issuing Entity:
Local 511,913,392 7,528,138 1.0428/.2269 68 23.4/22.7
Parish 1,644,737,468 15,470,026 215 74.1/72.8
State Agency 101,270,000 14,467,143 7 2.4/4.5
Issue Size:
Large [ > $1M] 2,226,244,757 10,550,923 2.2635/.0001 211 72.8/98.6
Small 31, 676, 103 400,963 79 27.2/1.4
State Audit Regulations:
Compliant 1,765,309, 175 8, 487, 063 7.5815/.0000 208 71.7/78.2
Non-compliant 492,611,685 6, 007,460 82 28.3/21.8
Last Audit:
Within 12 months of sale 1,454,550,071 8,762,350 1.9924/.0007 166 57.2/64.4
Noncurrent 803,370,789 6,478,797 124 42.8/35.6
106
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The above are to be expected given the nature of the 
sample collected. Louisiana is a largely rural state, 
and does not contain the population centers that 
typically generate larger debt issues. This sample also 
contains issues not typically recorded in industry 
statistics because of their small size and the 
peripatetic nature of bond issuance by small, less 
populous districts. Including those smaller issues from 
less frequent issuers allows conclusions about the bond 
market in Louisiana as a whole, rather than just the 
large issue, more completely traded segment of the 
market.
B. Analyses of Contribution Data
1. Hypothesis One
Bond market players are not major sources of 
contributions for publicly elected officials exercising 
control over the bond issuance process.
The magnitude of influence attributable to bond 
market players is the focus of Hypothesis One. As 
explained in chapter three, market theory prompts us to 
the belief that influence is if not directly at least 
proportionately related to contributions. This belief is 
demonstrably shared by government regulators, who have 
focused their attempts to minimize improper influence on 
the campaign finance process. Therefore, an
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investigation of said improper influence needs to begin 
with an assessment of the relative strength of influence 
of interested parties: in this case, bond market players.
As discussed in chapter one, individual 
contributions of less than $250 are considered to be too 
numerous to possess significant influence and to be too 
small in amount to attract the necessary attention from 
candidates and their staff. This dismissal of 
contributions smaller than $250 is echoed by the MSRB, 
who chose to set the statutory cap on non-influential 
contributions by bond market players at that amount.
Table 4.3 summarizes contribution data for the offices of 
interest in this study. Candidates for three of the 
offices under consideration received contributions in 
excess of $250 from bond market players totaling more 
than 10 percent of all contributions greater than $250.
Interestingly, the candidate for Treasurer garnered 
33 percent of total contributions from bond market 
players. The staff of the LBC, charged with preparing 
information to assist the commission in its 
deliberations, reports to the Treasurer. The Treasurer 
is also responsible for arranging debt issuance for state 
agencies. It is not surprising, then, that bond market
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players would have an interest in gaining the ear of the 
successful candidate.
Representative Theriot also received contributions 
in excess of 10 percent of total contributions1. Theriot 
is a CPA, and has been involved with public finance for 
some time. Since the time period of interest to this 
study, Theriot has run successfully for the office of 
Treasurer.
Senator Nunez was at the time President of the 
Senate as well as a member of the LBC. Contributions to 
his campaign by bond market players also exceeded 10 
percent.
While three of the offices of interest thus show 
evidence of significant contributory activity by 
interested parties, it is crucial to remember that 
contributions in excess of an arbitrary percentage are 
not conclusive evidence of undue influence. Hypothesis 
one seeks merely to provide some indication of the 
possibility that interested parties perceive 
contributions to the campaigns of influential officials 
as reasonable behaviour.
1Theriot ran unopposed for reelection, so the analysis 
speaks to contributions to his campaign as shorthand for 
contributions to candidates for the 83rd State 
Representative District seat.
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2. Hypothesis Two
Another, perhaps more accurate measure of the
likelihood of contributions being made by bond market
players in pursuit of privileged treatment is a
comparison of the distributions of contribution amounts.
The rationale for this comparison is that players, if
seeking to "purchase" business yielding greater than
normal profits, will make correspondingly larger
contributions. Thus hypothesis two:
H^: The distribution of the size of market player
contributions to officials in a position to exercise 
influence is significantly different from that of non­
players .
Table 4.4 provides results of an analysis of the 
distribution of player contributions in comparison with 
that of total contributions. As noted above, only 
contributions of $250 or more were included in this 
analysis. Both Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov statistics are provided. The Wilcoxon-Mann- 
Whitney test measures the central tendency of 
distributions, and is arguably slightly more efficient 
than the Kolomogorov-Smirnov test for large samples 
[Siegel & Castellan, 1988] . The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
is sensitive to any kind of difference in the 
distributions from which the samples were drawn. The


















Analysis of Contribution Distributions
Office Cont Source1 Mean Cont K-S Z> 2-tail p<= M-W Z> 2-tail p<=
Tl Sample BC 1395 0.9485 0.3293 -1.0399 0.2984
UW 2105 2.2483 0.0001 -4.1548 0.0001
Sum 1708 1.5 0.0222 -1.9999 0.0455
NonPlayer 1412
Att General BC 1470 0.5121 0.9557 -0.3793 0.7044
UW 490 0.9226 0.3623 -1.3168 0.1879
Sum 1570 0.6695 0.7612 -0.532 0.5947
NonPlayer 1401
Governor BC 2070 1.5272 0.0188 -2.7706 0.0056
UW 3021 3.0788 0.0001 -5.3715 0.0001
Sum 2558 2.9014 0.0001 -5.9325 0.0001
NonPlayer 1609
Lt Governor BC 1042 0.5228 0.9475 -0.5899 0.5553
UW 2750 0.6535 0.7866 -1.0439 0.2965
Sum 1286 0.6998 0.7115 -0.9437 0.3453
NonPlayer 968
i
. 1 BC = Bond Counsel
I UW = Underwriter
SUM = All Players 
I NonPlayer = Other Contributors
' Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distribution 



















Analysis of Contribution Distributions
Office Cont Source Mean Cont K-S Z 2-tail p<= M-W Z 2-tail p<=
Sec of State BC 306 1.5052 0.0215 -2.8344 0.0046
UW 1000 0.5176 0.9516 -0.6839 0.494
Sum 445 1.1238 0.1599 -2.2364 0.0253
NonPlayer 1151
Treasurer BC 1136 0.4263 0.9934 -0.4804 0.6309
UW 1589 2.0025 0.0007 -4.0991 0.0001
Sum 1438 1.6037 0.0117 -3.1813 0.0015
NonPlayer 713
R. Theriot BC 629 0.4035 0.9968 -0.5879 0.5566
UW 417 0.8200 0.5119 -1.1642 0.2443
Sum 681 0.6581 0.7794 -0.7685 0.4422
NonPlayer 597
S . Nunez BC 756 1.0842 0.1904 -1.9798 0.0477
UW 1169 0.3908 0.998 -0.169 0.8658




Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic is influenced by 
differences in central tendency, dispersion, and skewness 
and may therefore be a more appropriate test for this 
purpose.
Results for hypothesis two vary across offices, 
although the distribution of contributions by 
underwriters differs significantly from that of other 
donors over all the offices considered. Player 
contributions to candidates for Governor, Secretary of 
State, and Treasurer display evidence of belonging to a 
differently distributed population than that of total 
contributions. In the Governor's race both bond counsel 
and underwriters appear to contribute more heavily than 
one would expect based on overall contributions. Bond 
counsel tended to contribute larger amounts to candidates 
for Secretary of State than other contributors, while 
underwriters provided larger contributions to candidates 
for Treasurer.
Importantly, contributions from players to the other 
offices of interest seem in line with those from the 
public at large. This indicates that players do not as a 
matter of course contribute larger amounts to all 
candidates than other donors, and tends to reinforce the 
conclusion that players have more interest in currying
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favour with some officials than with others. Note 
especially that bond counsel contributions to candidates
for Attorney General are not demonstrably out of line
with those from other sources.
3. Hypothesis Three
The municipal bond market literature often suggests 
that elected officials can much more easily award 
business to their contributors when an issue is placed by 
negotiation rather than competitively. To date, no 
irrefutable evidence has been produced demonstrating the 
truth of that suggestion. Hypothesis three attempts to 
explore the validity of that suggestion by testing for a
significant relation between contributions by players
involved with specific issues and the placement method 
used for those issues:
Ha3 Contributions to officials by market players 
involved in the issue are significantly related to the 
placement method selected.
Table 4.5 presents results of an analysis of 
placement method and contributions. Test statistics 
investigate the independence of the distributions of 
contributions made by market players dependent upon issue 
placement method. The hypothesis is that players 
participating in negotiated issues will contribute larger 
amounts than those participating in competitively bid























M-W Z1 1-tail p<= K-S Z1 1-tail p<=
BC1 22,248 25, 669 -4.0052 . 0000 1.3116 .0320
UW 20,468 6,758 -8.1134 . 0000 3.8648 .0000
Sum 42,716 32, 427 -5.5171 .0000 3.0014 .0000
1 BC = Bond Counsel contributions 
UW = Underwriter contributions
Sum = All market player contributions
2 Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test of equality of distributions 




issues. As in the analysis of hypothesis two, both 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics 
are provided. Contributions by both underwriters and 
bond counsel are significantly related to the placement 
method selected. Note that overall market player 
contributions are also significantly related to choice of 
placement method, despite the opposing direction of the 
relationship between contribution size and placement 
method between underwriters and bond counsel.
Bond Counsel participating in negotiated bond 
issuance contribute more heavily than those involved in 
competitively bid issues. While it seems at first glance 
as though bond counsel would have no reason to prefer one 
method of placement over the other [regardless of method, 
bond counsel are required], they may have less direct 
reasons for soliciting negotiated placement business. As 
bond counsel are normally consulted at the inception of a 
bond issuance, they may have some influence over the 
selection of other players invited to participate in the 
transaction. If that is the case, bond counsel could 
extract rents from underwriters in exchange for advancing 
the underwriters' case with issuing officials.
As discussed in chapter three, there are well- 
accepted reasons for choosing to place an issue by
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negotiation rather than competitive bid. Therefore, the 
rejection of the hypothesis of no relation between 
contributions by bond counsel and placement method should 
not be seen as conclusive evidence of exercise of undue 
influence by elected officials.
Evidence from Table 4.5 indicates that underwriters 
participating in competitive issues contribute more.
This result is in direct opposition to our intuition that 
campaign contributions by market players are in part fees 
expended to purchase non-competitively bid bond issue 
business.
As discussed in chapter two, the gap between 
negotiated and competitive interest rates has steadily 
narrowed over the last few decades. That is, the benefit 
[increased profit] from underwriting negotiated placement 
issues as opposed to competitively bid issues has 
diminished over time. Increased attention paid to 
negotiated transactions by regulators and the media may 
be a factor in this narrowing gap.
Hildreth's [1994] suggestion that campaign 
contributions are solicited in exchange for player 
inclusion in the pool of approved issuance participants 
may provide an explanation for the observed relation 
between contribution size and placement method. His
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theory in part is that contributions are made in exchange 
for erection of barriers to entry into the municipal bond 
issuance process. Those barriers to entry may consist of 
a list of "approved underwriters and bond counsel"/ 
requirements as to firm size, experience, geographic 
location or innumerable other factors. If Hildreth's 
perceptions are accurate, underwriters may well prefer 
competitively bid issues, which are commonly understood 
to be much less amenable to influence peddling on the 
part of elected officials. Competitively bid issues thus 
are subjected to much less scrutiny than negotiated 
issues - the assumption is that market forces will ensure 
lowest cost debt placement.
C. Analyses Using The Regression Model
This project further investigates the relationship 
between contributions and municipal bond business by
utilizing regression analyses. The base model is
developed by aggregating variables common to prior 
research. As discussed in chapter two, studies focusing 
on municipal debt commonly include the following 
variables:
Size Face amount of the issue
Rating Bond rating assigned by a ratings agency
MktRate A measure of municipal market interest rates
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YrstoCall "Lock-in" period of the security 
CorNIssue Method used to select underwriter(s)
The most commonly used dependent variable is some 
measure of net cost of debt, usually Net Interest Cost.
As explained in chapter two, Net Interest Cost does not 
incorporate the time value of money, but is commonly used 
in the bond marketplace [NIC is also specified as 
required information on the LBC bond issue reporting 
form]. In order to facilitate comparison with prior 
research this study uses Net Interest Cost as a dependent 
variable.
The sample is partitioned into large [over $1 
million] and small issues in order to facilitate 
comparison with the extant literature, which commonly 
uses samples containing only issues of greater than $1 
million face value. As explained in chapter three, 
commercial bond information providers routinely collect 
data only for issues larger than $1 million, as their 
target audience [investors] is primarily concerned with 
issues widely available in the market.
Leonard [1996] uses logistic regression analysis to 
provide evidence that competitive and negotiated 
placement issues should not be pooled into a common 
sample for purposes of regression analyses. Leonard's
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study demonstrates that the influence of explanatory 
variables varies across placement method, and thus calls 
into question the validity of much prior research. Note, 
however, that much of that literature consists of studies 
performed at a time when competitive issues comprised the 
vast majority of issues. Therefore prior research may 
have been accurate for the market of the time, while 
current research should adapt to the shift in placement 
method.
Following Leonard's perception, the portion of the 
sample having face amounts greater than $1 million is 
further partitioned by placement method. The small issue 
size portion of the sample contains only 7 competitively 
placed issues, so is not partitioned. The assumption is 
that issue size is more determinate than placement method 
for purposes of this study.
1. Hypothesis Four
While the regression model used in this study has 
been demonstrated to provide explanatory power for bond 
issue transactions by prior research, much of that 
research took place some time ago. Hypothesis four seeks 
to legitimate the model by using data from current, 
Louisiana issues:
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HA4 The independent variables included in the base model 
possess significant explanatory power for Net Interest 
Cost.
Table 4.6 presents results of the base model 
regression analysis. The model possesses some 
explanatory power for issues larger than $1 million 
[regardless of placement method], which drives the 
model's significance for the sample as a whole. In the 
case of negotiated issues, that significance is centered 
in two variables: face amount of the issue [Facek] and
the market interest rate [BB20Bond]. Competitive issue 
NIC is more closely related to the market interest rate 
and the "lock-in period" of the investment [YrsToCall].
The model does not provide much explanatory power 
for the subsample of issues smaller than $1 million. As 
discussed above, that lack of fit is reasonable given 
prior studies' lack of small issue size data. Of the 
model's variables, only the market interest equivalent 
[BB20Bond] and "lock in" period [YrstoCall] are 
sigificantly related to NIC. Issuing entity rating 
[Rating], issue size [FaceK] and placement method 
[CorNIssue] appear to be non-significant contributors to 
NIC. The conclusion is that small issues are constrained


















Base Regression Model1 Results (t-values)
Face < $1M Face > $1M 
Negotiated
























































Sample Size 79 89 122 290
Adj. R' .05961 .26927 .47983 .33026
Regression F 1.82411 7.48537 23.32326 24.75179
1 NIC = Size + YrsToCall + Rating + MktRate + CorNIssue 
NIC=Net Interest Cost 
FaceK=Face amount of the issue/1000
BB20Bond=Bond Buyer 20 Bond Rate for the week of sale 
Brate=l if the issue has a rating of Baa or lower 
Arate=l if the issue has a rating of Aaa, Aa or A 
CorNIssue=l if the issue was placed via competitive bid
* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01 123
by factors much different than those influencing larger 
issues.
Diagnostics for the model suggest that while not 
possessing a high degree of explanatory power, the base 
model is relatively robust with respect to common threats 
to model adequacy. Multicollinearity is not a problem, 
as the maximum variance inflation factor [VIF] for this 
model is 1.64. Neter et al. [1989] assert that maximum 
VIFs in excess of ten indicate multicollinearity 
problems, which in turn suggests that multicollinearity 
is not an issue for this analysis. Outlying observations 
were identified by inspection of plots and residuals 
analysis. These outliers were evaluated for influence 
using DFFITS, DFBETAS, and Cook's Distance calculations. 
None of the outliers was determined to be unduly 
influential, therefore all of the observations were 
incorporated in the analyses [Neter et al., 1989].
2. Hypotheses Five - Seven
The preceding analyses have demonstrated some 
measure of relation between campaign contributions and 
bond issue business. That relation may be seen as 
behaviour to be constrained. As discussed in chapter 
one, the approach of the MSRB and various state 
regulatory agencies has largely been precisely that.
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Alternatively, one might adopt an accounting perspective 
and attempt to develop a cost benefit analysis relating 
the benefit of ameliorating that behaviour with the cost 
of behaviour modification.
This study seeks to provide some evidence of the 
public cost of elected officials trading bond business 
for campaign contributions. The public cost of non- 
optimal selection of bond issue participants will [at 
least in part] be embedded within Net Interest Cost. 
Recall that underwriters profit on a bond issue by 
purchasing the issue from the issuer and then reselling 
the issue to investors at higher price [that is, higher 
effective interest rate]. Therefore the public cost of 
non-optimal issuance practices can be measured in part by 
the variance in Net Interest Cost attributable to 
contributions.
Amounts contributed by the various players in a bond 
issue are incorporated into the regression model to test 
hypotheses five through seven:
Has Contributions by bond counsel involved in the 
issuance process have significant explanatory power for 
Net Interest Cost.
HA6 Contributions by underwriters involved in the 
issuance process have significant explanatory power for 
Net Interest Cost.
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Ha7 Contributions by all market players involved in the 
issuance process have significant explanatory power for 
Net Interest Cost.
As shown in Table 4.7, none of the contribution 
variables [BCCont, UWCont and SumCont] evidence a 
significant association with NIC. Therefore the analysis 
provides no support for hypotheses five, six or seven. 
This lack of support should not be construed as evidence 
that the behaviour in question does not occur. As 
explained by Hildreth [1994], contributions may be 
solicited by officials, and made by bond market players, 
as an entry price into a lucrative market [in Hildreth's 
terms, pay to play]. If Hildreth's explanation is 
accurate, the public cost of this behaviour would only be 
determinable by comparison of interest rates in the 
municipal bond market with those of alternative 
investments not susceptible to third-party moral hazard, 
a task beyond the scope of this study.
3. Hypotheses Eight - Ten
This study also investigates the information 
asymmetry of the municipal bond marketplace. Chapter 
three sets forth arguments that the bond market is much 
less complete than the equities markets in terms of 
information availability. As explained therein, 
governmental financial reporting is troublesome because


















Extended Model Results1 (t-values)
Face < $1M Face > $1M 
Negotiated





























































Sample Size 79 89 122 290
Ad]. R* .10482 .34562 .50094 .36182
Regression F 1.76108 5.22538 12.04154 14.65416
1 NIC = Base Model + GO + Brown + BCCont + UWCont +SumCont + AudComp + LADate 
GO=l if a general obligation issue 
Brown*=Brown' s Index score
BCCont=Contributions made by issue's bond counsel 
UWCont=Contributions made by issue's underwriters 
AudComp^l if issuer is compliant with state reporting statutes 
LADate=l if last issuer audit within 12 months of sale date
* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01 127
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of a lack of easily quantifiable measures of goal 
achievement. That is, the goal of government is not to 
produce maximal profits in the form of cash but rather to 
produce maximal return on investment in terms of services 
provided to some constituency. This lack of "bottom 
line" focus has often been offered as an explanation [ego 
te absolvo?] for the common perception of government 
financial reports as arcane or labrynthine.
Brown [1993] provides a scoring system whereby 
information commonly available from the general purpose 
financial reports [GPFS] of a governmental entity can be 
summarized and compared with similar scores for other 
entities with similar characteristics [most commonly 
population]. Brown's contention is that this index may 
thus be used as a proxy for some of the information 
contained within financial reports. Strongly influencing 
Brown's argument is the notion that most investors, 
indeed the majority of governmental officials, are unable 
or unwilling to parse GPFS's for relevant information. 
Thus Brown's Index provides useable information not 
otherwise available to the majority of investors: 
information concerning the entity's financial position 
and ability to repay debt. Hypothesis eight investigates 
the relation between that information and NIC:
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HA8 Brown's Index of financial well-being has 
significant explanatory power for NIC.
Table 4.7 demonstrates that Brown's Index [Brown] is 
significantly related to NIC for issues larger than $1 
million. Small issues, as noted above, exist in a 
necessarily smaller market, and it seems reasonable to 
suppose that players in that smaller, and less complete, 
market are possessed of information about the issuing 
entity and its debt-repayment ability outside the bounds 
of publicly available financial reports.
A measure of the public availability of entity 
financial information is compliance with state reporting 
requirements. Louisiana statutes require audited 
financial reports biannually for all governmental 
entities. Noncompliance with statutes, as indicated in 
chapter three, does not entail onerous penalties, making 
it possible for entities to neglect financial reporting 
without dire consequences.
Information about the financial status of debtors is 
routinely shown to be a factor in credit and investment 
decisions. Availability of that information for 
governmental entities is not, however, assured as it is 
for non-governmental entities issuing securities 
publicly. Hypothesis nine speaks to financial
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information availability in a minimal sense by using
state reporting requirement compliance:
Ha9 Issuing entity compliance with state financial 
reporting requirements [AudComp] has significant 
explanatory power for NIC.
There are 82 entities not in compliance with state 
reporting requirements at the time their bond issue was 
presented to the LBC for approval. Of these entities, 39 
were issuing debt with face value less than $1 million.
70 placed issues by negotiation, while 12 used the 
competitive bid process. Compliance with reporting 
requirements is not significantly related to NIC for any 
of the sample subsets, or for the sample as a whole.
Given the above-mentioned truism that information as 
to the financial status of debtors is relevant to 
investment and credit decisions, it is surprising that no 
relation is found between public availability of audited 
financial data and NIC. The reason may lie in the 
incompleteness of the bond market and the competitive 
advantage of market players. It is doubtful that 
underwriters would agree to purchase issues without 
information as to the entity's ability to retire the 
issue, but entirely possible that parties to the 
transaction [bond counsel, underwriters, private 
placement purchasers] acquire that information through
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nonpublic channels, and in fact demand that information 
prior to participation. The incomplete nature of the 
bond market may function to limit the necessity of 
disseminating that information more completely.
Another tenet of market theory holds that financial 
information possesses value in relation to its 
timeliness. That is, financial information is more 
valuable when more recent. Investors should therefore 
demand [again, by way of interest cost] continuing 
financial reporting. Given that it is not uncommon for 
an issue approved by the LBC to be brought to market one 
or two years later, it seems likely that market players 
and investors would prefer more current information than 
that available at time of LBC approval.
The value of timely information, as indicated by an
audited financial report dated within twelve months of
the issue's date of sale, is explored by hypothesis ten:
Ha10 Timeliness of financial data [LADate] has 
significant explanatory power for NIC.
As for compliance with state reporting requirements,
there is no significant relation demonstrated between
timeliness of financial reports and NIC.
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D. Extension of Regression Analyses
Leonard [1996] provides evidence that past attempts 
to determine factors of Net Interest Cost for bond issues 
may have been flawed. Leonard's contention is that 
competitively bid issues are not identical to negotiated 
issues in terms of influencing factors. Equally, bond 
issues with dedicated repayment streams [Revenue bonds] 
are argued to differ from issues sold without the backing 
of specific repayment sources. As mentioned in chapter 
one, the majority of bonds issued in recent years have 
been revenue bonds. As with the competitive versus 
negotiated split, this shift in bond characteristics may 
indicate a fundamental change in the underlying 
characteristics of the bond marketplace.
In order to examine the significance of repayment 
options on the NIC models developed in this study, the 
portion of the sample with face value of $ 1 million or 
more was partitioned by repayment schema. Tables 4.8 and 
4.9 present results of redoing the regression analyses 
discussed above with the modified sample partitions.
The base model [Table 4.8] results clearly 
demonstrate that GO bond interest costs are much more 
closely approximated than those of Revenue issues. 
Significant variables in the analysis of GO issues


















Bond Type Base Regression Model1 Results (t-values)
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Sample Size 79 114 97 290
Adj. R' .05961 ..26913 .74427 .33026
Regression F 1.82411 7.93507 47.56622 24.75179
1 NIC = Size + YrsToCall + Rating + MktRate + CocNIssue 
NIC=Net Interest C>, i 
FaceK=Face amount of the j .isue/1000
BB20Bond=Bond Buyer 20 Bond Rate for the week of sale 
Brate=l if the issue has a rating of Baa or lower 
Arate=l if the issue has a rating of Aaa, Aa or A 
CorNIssue=l if the issue was placed via competitive bid* P < .10* * P < .05* ★ * P < .01 133
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include market interest rate [BB20Bond], investment 
period [YRsToCall] and placement method [CorNIssue]. As 
would seem reasonable, market interest rate is directly 
related to NIC and inversely related to the length of the 
investment period.
Higher NIC are associated with competitive 
placement. This relation is contrary to our expectations 
that competitive placement, by virtue of its public bid 
process, will produce lower NIC than a privately 
negotiated, non-market transaction. Note, however, that 
placmemnt method is not a significant variable with 
respect to the Revenue bond portion of the sample.
Table 4.9 presents data from the extended model. As 
in the prior analysis, underwriter contributions 
[UWCont]and total player contributions [SumCont] are not 
significant contributors to the model. Bond counsel 
contributions are significant for the sample composed of 
large general obligation [G 0] bonds. This significance 
must be interpreted cautiously because of the previously 
mentioned near-monopoly on bond counsel business by a 
single firm.
Variables representing timely availability of 
financial information also demonstrate no significant 
explanatory power for NIC. For Revenue bonds, Brown's
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Sample Size 79 114 97 290
Adj. R2 .02135 .33541 .75326 .36182
Reqression F 1.15471 6.18457 27.64262 14.65416
1 NIC = Base Model + GO + Brown + BCCont + UWCont +SumCont + AudComp + LADate 
GO=l if a general obligation issue 
Brown=Brown's Index score
BCCont=Contributions made by issue's bond counsel 
UWCont=Contributions made by issue's underwriters 
AudComp=l if issuer is compliant with state reporting statutes 
LADate=l if last issuer audit within 12 months of sale date 
* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01 135
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Index is inversely related to NIC, in line with our 
expectations that increasing financial health enables 
entities to borrow at lower rates. Note, however, that 
Brown's Index displays no explanatory power over NIC for 
the general obligation bond sample. This result is 
counterintuitive, as we would expect information 
concerning financial health of the issuing entity to be 
more important to prospective purchasers of debt not 
incorporating specific revenue streams for payback.
E. Summary
This chapter details data collection methods and 
presents descriptive information about the disparate 
datasets used in the analysis. Results of the 
nonparametric analyses of campaign financing are 
presented and interpreted in terms of the theoretic 
approach detailed in chapter one. Results of a 
regression analysis with the sample data partitioned by 
size and placement method are discussed, as are results 
of a further analysis of the sample partitioned by 
repayment characteristics.
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Chapter Five
Summary and Conclusions
This chapter summarizes the study and provides an 
interpretation of results aimed at both aligning the 
study with other research in the field and discussing the 
implications of the study for public policy. The first 
section presents a brief overview of the study's intent 
and methodology. Results of the research and 
implications for policymakers are discussed in the second 
section. Section three focuses on limitations of the 
study and the chapter concludes with suggestions for 
further research.
A. Overview of the Study
Past research investigating the municipal bond 
marketplace has focused on determining factors that 
influence cost of debt. While there has been significant 
agreement between the various studies as to influential 
factors, it is important to note that the municipal debt 
marketplace has changed significantly since the majority 
of that research was performed. For example, the portion 
of issues sold via the competitive bid process has gone 
from 80 percent of all issues to less than 20 percent. 
Similarly, the percentage of general obligation debt has
137
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decreased while that of revenue bonds has increased. 
Therefore a reassessment of factors influencing cost of 
debt is warranted.
Interest has also increased in the mechanisms of 
municipal debt issuance, driven in part by the tremendous 
increase in municipal debt issuance and the general 
tightening of municipal finances caused by exogenous 
economic factors. Municipal debt has become a much more 
widely held investment vehicle as well. The increase in 
appeal of municipal debt has emphasized the lack of 
information available to potential investors, and 
revitalized research investigating the municipal debt 
market.
Additionally, perceptions of the market as biased 
and amenable to privileged trading have focused regulator 
interest. Federal and state regulators have evinced an 
abiding interest in the municipal debt marketplace. A 
significant portion of that interest revolves around the 
ability of elected officials to extract campaign 
contributions as a quid pro quo for bond business.
This study attempts to investigate the relationship 
between political contributions and municipal bond 
transactions in Louisiana. Data was collected from 
several state agencies - the Legislative Auditor's Office
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[entity financial statements], the Louisiana Bond 
Commission [information about bond issues], and the State 
Board of Ethics [capaign finance filings]. Nonparametric 
tests were used to investigate the relationship between 
bond market player contributions and bond transactions. 
Regression analysis was used as a means to examine the 
relationships between several proxies for financial 
information availability and as a tool to explore the 
public cost of influence peddling.
B. Results and Implications
The first section of the study sought to establish 
evidence that players in the municipal bond market behave 
differently than the rest of the public with respect to 
campaign contributions to candidates for influential 
office. Influential offices were defined as those 
elected members of the state government in a postion to 
affect municipal bond issuance transactions by either the 
state or one of its political subdivisions [Governor, Lt. 
Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, State 
Treasurer, and those members of the legislature sitting 
on the Louisiana Bond Commission].
Contributions by bond market players accounted for 
more than ten percent of total contributions to 
candidates for the office of State Treasurer, and for two
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of the legislators sitting on the LBC. One of the 
legislators was President of the Senate at the time, and 
the other subsequently ran successfully for the office of 
State Treasurer. Thus expectations that bond market 
players are sources of significant levels of 
contributions to candidates for influential office were 
only partially met. Explanations for this may rest in 
the relative size of total campaign contributions to the 
various offices, and in the fact that several of the 
candidates were running unopposed.
A second measure of influence via contributions to 
campaigns is a comparison of the distribution of 
contributions from market players with that of non-market 
players. Nonparametric tests of equality of distribution 
were used to investigate the significance of differences 
between distribution of contribution amounts. These 
tests were itemized by office, as the initial analyses 
indicated differences in contributory behaviour across 
the offices of interest. The tests were also partitioned 
by player type [bond counsel or underwriter], as staff at 
both the LBC and the Legislative Auditor's Office 
suggested that benefits [and hence motivations] were 
likely to differ between the two.
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For the offices of interest as a group, the 
distribution of contributions by underwriters is 
significantly different from that of non-market players: 
contributions by underwriters tend to be larger than 
those made by the balance of the population. This 
difference is large enough that the distribution of all 
player contributions is also significantly higher than 
that of non-market players. Likewise, the distributions 
of contributions to the Governor's and State Treasurer's 
candidates were significantly higher than those of non- 
market players, again driven by underwriter 
contributions.
A final measure of the relationship between 
contributions by market players and bond business is less 
direct. As discussed in chapter two, a common assumption 
made by observers of the public finance markets is that 
influence peddling is much easier [and more profitable] 
when municipal bond issues are placed via negotiation 
rather than the competitive bidding process. If that 
assumption is true, we should see a direct relation 
between contribution levels and selection of placement 
method. Our expectations are that higher contributions
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will be an indication that placements are more likely to 
be negotiated than competitively bid.
Tests of the association between contribution levels 
and placement method do not produce results in line with 
expectations. Contrary to expectations, the relationship 
between underwriter contributions and negotiated 
placements is negative - that is, higher contributions 
are associated with competitive placements. The 
association between bond counsel contributions and 
negotiated placement is positive. As discussed in 
chapter four, bond counsel may prefer negotiated 
placement because, as originary members of the project 
staff, they are able to influence underwriter choice. If 
counsel can indeed influence underwriter choice they are 
therefore able to extract rents of some sort from 
underwriters. In this situation influence peddling, if 
extant, is an indirect relation between underwriters, 
bond counsel, and elected officials.
Explanations for the unexpected negative 
relationship between underwriter contributions and 
placement method may be a function of the narrowing of 
the spread between negotiated and competitively placed 
issues, which functions to minimize the benefits of 
negotiated placement [that is, underwriters seem no
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longer able to extract excess rents via negotiated 
transactions]. Note also that as regulators and other 
interested parties focus more attention on negotiated 
issues they tend to concurrently assume that 
competitively bid issues are less in need of review. 
Underwriters seeking to benefit from influence peddling 
may therefore prefer competitively bid isses. This 
explanation is supported by Hildreth's [1994] suggestion 
that "pay-to-play" has supplanted more direct forms of 
influence peddling. Again, Hildreth's proposition is 
that bond market players, rather than buying business in 
discrete quanta, buy into the pool of qualified bond 
issue participants.
Thus the first section of the study produces results 
only partially in accord with expectations. While 
contributions from players in the bond market are 
demonstrably larger than those from other members of the 
public, it is far from clear that there is any direct 
influence being sold.
The second section of the study utilizes linear 
regression techniques in an attempt to discern the public 
cost of the theorized peddling of influence. As a 
baseline for the analysis, a regression model was created 
by aggregating variables common to prior research. The
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baseline model, in line with prior research, uses Net 
Interest Cost as a dependent variable, and the face 
amount of the issue, rating assigned by external agency 
[if any], a measure of market interest rates for the week 
of issue sale [the Bond Buyer 20 Bond Index], and years 
to first call [a measure of the "lock-in period" of the 
investment] as independent variables. This baseline 
should enable ready assimilation of the study into the 
extant literature. A further advantage of the baseline 
approach is a more effective isolation of the effects [if 
any] of contributory behaviour on Net Interest Cost 
[NIC].
The sample of bond issues is partitioned into large 
[face value greater than $1 million] and small issues.
The large group is then partioned by placement method 
[competitive or negotiated]. As explained in chapter 
four, Leonard [1996] provides compelling evidence that 
negotiated and competitively bid issues are influenced 
differently, and the partitioning of sample data 
acknowledges the strength of Leonard's arguments.
As the baseline model is an aggregation of variables 
found significant in past research, we expect the model 
to possess considerable explanatory power over NIC. 
Congruent with the discussion in chapter four, the model
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does not fit the small issue subsample particularly well. 
That lack of fit is reasonable given the lack of small 
face value issues in prior research samples. Prior 
research, often limited by availability of data, focused 
almost exclusively on larger issues, thus producing 
models composed of items pertinent to investors weighing 
alternatives in the larger capital markets. Smaller 
issues, on the other hand, are sold in a much less 
complete market, and are sold to investors with different 
concerns.
The baseline model also possesses limited 
explanatory power over larger issues placed by 
negotiation. One rationale for this lack of fit is the 
ability of negotiated issue participants to acquire 
information outside normal channels of distribution.
Size of the issue and prevailing market interest rate are 
the only significant variables in the model for 
negotiated issues, which adds credence to the theory that 
participants have non-public channels for information 
[that is, they do not rely on agency ratings].
Large competitive issues are most closely modeled by 
the baseline equation. This is congruent with the 
perceived characteristics of the bond market during the 
majority of prior research. The baseline model thus
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provides a link to prior research and an indication of 
how the municipal bond market has changed structurally 
over the intervening period.
Arguments concerning regulation of political 
contributions by bond market players tend to focus on the 
public cost of such activities, The perception is that 
market players recoup the cost of contributions by 
lowering the price at which they are willing to purchase 
debt issued by the entities of officials contributed to. 
If contributions to officials of debt-issuing entities 
can be properly characterized as purchases of influence 
for which below market prices of municipal debt will be 
the quid pro quo, it also is reasonable to assume that 
larger contributions will elicit [command] larger 
variances from market interest rates. That is, 
contributions by successful players should be significant 
additions to the baseline model.
Contrary to expectations, contributions by market 
players evidence no explanatory power over NIC. This 
suggests that the common perception of the municipal debt 
marketplace as rife with corruption is either wrong or 
misspecifies the problem. Note that the lack of 
significance holds for player contributions considered as
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a whole as well as individually [bond counsel or 
underwriter].
Implications for policymakers are contrary to the 
opinions expressed by regulators. Given the study's 
failure to find a relationship between market player 
contributions and NIC it does not appear that influence 
peddling behaviour, if it exists, significantly affects 
the public cost of entity debt issuance. If influence 
peddling was a factor in the observed elections, it was 
not widely evident from an analysis of reported campaign 
contributions. Regulation can, of course, only be 
enforced over the universe of reported events.
Therefore, regulation of market player contributions may 
be beneficial from a perspective of image management, but 
it does not seem likely to pass the sort of cost benefit 
analysis accountants routinely impose on decision 
alternatives.
This study also investigates the information 
asymmetry of the municipal debt marketplace. If 
generally accepted accounting theory is given credence, 
information embedded in publicly available financial 
statments will have a demonstrable relationship to NIC. 
That is, investors will use said information to determine 
the risk/return on investment tradeoff of that particular
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investment. If such is the case, we should see a 
significant and negative relationship between increasing 
measures of financial health and NIC.
Information from bond-issuing entities' General 
Purpose Financial Statements is used to create Brown's 
Index of Financial Health. As discussed in chapter four, 
Brown's Index is calculated by preparation of ten 
measures of financial health. Those ratios are then 
scored by comparison with the ratios of comparably sized 
entities participating in the Government Finance Officers 
Association's Certification for Excellence in Financial 
Reporting program and the scores summed to provide the 
index.
Obviously not all entities choose to participate in 
the GFOA's program: equally obviously participants do not 
represent a random sample of entities. However, 
participants in the program are arguably among the 
healthiest of entities, and thus the possibility of 
overstatement of financial health is minimal. Given that 
investors are motivated to seek out the healthiest 
entities to invest in, this index seems a reasonable 
choice for investigating the relationship between 
financial information and investor assessment of risk 
[aka NIC].
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Results of the regression analyses indicate that the 
hypothesized negative relation between Brown's Index and 
NIC does exist for issues with face amounts larger than 
$1 million. NIC of issues smaller than $1 million is not 
significantly influenced by Brown's Index, a result which 
is in accordance with our intuition that smaller issue 
investors have different concerns than large issue 
investors. Smaller issue investors also tend to be 
institutions within the region, which may indicate that 
these investors are provided with information exogenous 
to and perhaps contradictory to that found in financial 
reports. Another interpretation is that financial report 
based measures of financial health are not as precise for 
smaller entities. In other words, the smaller 
transaction amounts endemic to smaller entities, and the 
correspondingly larger percentage variances, may make the 
use of standardized ratios problematic.
The study also investigates the effect of 
information timeliness on NIC. Financial information is 
often likened to newspaper stories and portrayed as 
information with value that decreases markedly over time. 
The rationale for that portrayal is simply that investors 
will act immediately on information they receive. The 
ability to profitably use information is thus tightly
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constrained by its age. Investors should therefore be 
willing to pay a premium for more recent information.
Two measurements of timeliness are incorporated in 
this study. First, a dichotomous variable signifying 
compliance with Louisiana statutes governing entity 
financial disclosure [AudComp] is incorporated into the 
regression model. As discussed in chapter three, 
Louisiana statutes require at a minimum biannual audited 
financial reports. Compliance with these statutes is 
measured as of the date the entity's bond issue was 
presented to the LBC for approval. This measure of 
timely disclosure exhibits no significant relation with 
NIC.
Second, a more restrictive measure of information 
timeliness is created by determining whether the debt 
issuing entity had released audited financial reports 
dated within twelve months of the sale date of the bond 
issue [LastAud]. Investors, if making investment 
decisions, should be interested in information current at 
the time of their decision. That is, at the moment when 
the bond issue becomes an investment alternative rather 
than when the entity solicits state approval for the 
issue. The second measure of timeliness of information
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disclosure should therefore be more closely related to 
effects on NIC.
Neither of the two measures of information 
timeliness demonstrate significant explanatory power over 
NIC. This result is in line with accounting research 
studies looking at corporate information disclosure, 
which suggest that the influence of publicly reported 
financial information on stock prices [cost of funds] is 
largely embedded within stock prices prior to the 
official release date of the information. While bond 
issues are peripatetic events rather than a continuous 
market, a similar phenomena seems reasonable given that 
the equity and debt markets are, at least to some degree, 
substitutes for one another.
Implications of this analysis for legislators and 
regulators are clear - statutory requirement of public 
entity financial reporting does not appear to benefit 
investors in municipal debt by providing decision-useful 
information. Importantly, this analysis does not address 
other audiences for municipal financial reporting. 
Concerned citizens, special interest groups, and 
government oversight committees may well benefit from 
mandated reporting. The only point this analysis makes 
is that the timeliness of financial reporting by debt
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issuing entities does not appear to influence the cost of 
that debt.
C. Limitations
In an effort to standardize regulatory constraints 
on contributory behaviour and limit variations in 
exogenous economic factors sample data was collected from 
entities within a single state. While that strategy 
reduces the risk of mistaking economic or cultural 
variance for influence of the factors studied, it 
perforce limits generalizability of the study to other 
political subdivisions of the country. The majority of 
players in the bond market in Louisiana reside within the 
borders of the state, and primarily do business in 
Louisiana.
Regulation governing the behaviour of those players 
and the entities they do business with is also unique to 
Louisiana. There may be considerable similarities 
between statutes concerning political contributions, 
financial disclosure and municipal debt issuance in 
Louisiana and those of other states, but the degree of 
that similarity should be determined before extrapolation 
of this research to other states.
Another limitation of the study is the necessary 
reliance upon self-reported data from self-interested
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parties. While campaign finance reports have been 
required for some time and thus candidates have had time 
to learn the requirements of those reports/ there is 
little assurance that the reports as mandated and filed 
contain an information set completely specifying all 
contributions and their sources. Staff at the SBE audit 
a sample of the filings, and the reports are available 
for public perusal and questioning, however the volume of 
reports filed [over six thousand per election year] 
limits the probability of a report being audited and that 
limitation may influence the preparation of the report.
Similarly, bond issue data was gathered from a time 
span in which information disclosure was largely 
voluntary. The Louisiana state government has 
implemented regulations requiring completed issue 
worksheet filings, but implementation of that regulation 
is constrained by the limited number of staff available 
to oversee compliance and by an unwillingness on the part 
of market players to comply with the regulations. 
Therefore the sample of bond issues included in this 
sample is not random, although it is composed of every 
issue for which the requisite information was accessible.
The composition of the pool of market players in 
Louisiana may well be unique also. A single law firm
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handles approximately 90 percent of the bond counsel work 
in the state. The bond counsel market, therefore, can 
hardly be described as open or complete. This lack of 
completeness in the market, coupled with a tendency for 
bond counsel to charge whatever the State Legal 
Commission sets as a maximum fee for bond counsel work, 
perhaps limits the application of this research to other, 
more complete, markets. Note, however, that the single 
law firm handling the majority of bond counsel business 
maintains that majority in part by merging with or 
purchasing firms which demonstrate an ability to get and 
keep bond counsel business.
This study looks at the campaign contributions of 
bond market players to statewide officials in a position 
to influence bond issue transactions. Arguably, 
influence peddling also goes on at the local level. For 
Louisiana, that local level is difficult to isolate. 
Louisiana municipalities tend be governed by elected 
councils, who often select mayors and city treasurers 
from their own ranks. Determining ex ante which 
officials might be selected would require a degree of 
knowledge not easily available and which would require a 
strong focus on each entity of interest. As our 
perception of bond market players is one of individuals
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interested in doing business with as many entities as 
possible, it is likely that market players are not 
willing to devote the time and energy necessary to keep 
up with the local political situation of multiple, 
relatively small entities that do not issue debt often.
D. Suggestions for Future Research
The results of this research are based solely on 
data relating to transactions taking place in Louisiana. 
As mentioned earlier, the single state focus of the study 
may limit generalizability of results to other locations. 
An important extension of this study would thus be 
research using data from other states.
While political and regulatory environments probably 
mandate individual state by state analyses, multiple 
studies of states could be combined using meta-analytic 
techniques. Such a meta-analysis would provide valuable 
information concerning commonalities across political and 
cultural borders. Illuminating the commonalities would 
allow better-informed conclusions to be drawn concerning 
the underlying structure of the municipal bond market, 
and provide input to the regulatory process currently 
underway at the national level.
The discussion of results above mentions that bond 
issue data was provided to the LBC on a voluntary basis
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prior to 1993. The voluntary nature of that disclosure 
[of transaction details] can be interpreted as suggesting 
that the bond issues included in this study do not 
represent a random sample of Louisiana issues. Similar 
research focusing on a period after disclosure became 
mandatory would not be subject to that interpretation, 
and could therefore provide additional evidence of the 
significance of issuing entity financial disclosure 
variables.
The literature would also benefit from more 
ethnographic approaches to the problem of influence 
peddling by elected officials. The necessarily sub rosa 
nature of that influence peddling suggests that 
statistical analyses, focusing on large quantities of 
publicly available data rather than the stories told by 
individuals involved in specific situations, may not be 
the most effective method of studying the issues at hand. 
In-depth studies of the individuals involved on a case by 
case basis might provide a more accurate picture of the 
problem, and would enable researchers to address common 
perceptions of political behaviour and the bond market 
more readily.
Another important extension of the study would be a 
replication performed with data from the period
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immediately subsequent to the effective date of MSRB Rule 
G-37. That replication would allow at least limited 
conclusions to be drawn concerning the efficacy of 
regulatory activity. Comparison of data between the two 
studies might also provide indirect evidence of influence 
peddling by highlighting changes in relative market 
position of players as contributory activity was 
constrained.
This research project is currently being expanded by 
investigations of data from other states. One of the 
enabling factors in expanding the study is the trend 
toward making campaign finance data available 
electronically. The Federal Election Commission and 
several of the relevant state agencies are currently 
allowing access to filings via electronic means, which 
greatly reduces the time and financial investment 
necessary to conduct similar studies. Similarly, the 
MSRB and the various states are in the process of 
instituting financial disclosure repositories where 
entities can place their financial reports for improved 
public access.
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